The Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice

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Social Psychology and Social Justice: Critical Principles and Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century

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Abstract
This introduction presents the concept of social justice as an idea (and ideal) linked to Enlightenment philosophies and their realization in modern democracies. The historical emergence of social psychology as a discipline is discussed in relation to twentieth-century movements for postcolonial independence and civil rights, the demise of the eugenics movement, and challenges to ideologies of ethnic hierarchy. Five principles of a social psychology of social justice for the twenty-first century are proposed, orienting empirical work toward (1) a critical ontological perspective, (2) assumption of a normative stance toward justice, (3) alliance with the subordinate, (4) analysis of resistance, and (5) commitment to public science and scientific activism. Chapters within the volume are situated in relation to six areas of inquiry: (1) critical ontologies, paradigms, and methods; (2) race and ethnicity; (3) gender and sexuality; (4) class and poverty; (5) globalization and conflict; and (6) intervention, advocacy, and social policy.

Key Words: social justice, social psychology, politics, critical ontology, critical psychology

On August 9, 2014, a young unarmed man was shot repeatedly—and finally—in the chest by a police officer following an altercation, resulting in massive protests that awoke a community and a nation to the unfinished business of eradicating racial inequality. The young man was Michael Brown. He was African American, living in a predominantly African American community of Ferguson, Missouri, policed primarily by a white police force.

Two years later, in the summer of 2016, high-profile shootings of young African American men continued, with the deaths of Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge and Philando Castile in Falcon Heights, Minnesota. Investigations in Baltimore and Chicago revealed a culture of endemic racism within the police force of those cities. The deaths of Black men continued to be better known than that of Black women such as Sandra Bland, Meagan Hookaday, Nicola McKenna, and many more, revealing the way in which racism and sexism coexist to silence the experience of women of color (Crenshaw & Ritchie, 2015).

The deaths of Brown, Sterling, Castile, Bland, and McKenna, regrettably just some of so many similar incidents that have fueled the Black Lives Matter social movement, remind us that the work of social justice—of fairness and equality, of freedom from oppression and domination—endures. The quest to achieve equal rights, dignity, and access to resources across the lines of race, class, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, ability status, nationality, and other social identities endures.

We psychologists, who uphold in our ethical code "the dignity and worth of all people" (American Psychological Association [APA], 2010, p. 4), have a moral imperative to use our science to contribute to this quest.

Emerging with the warning of eugenics ideology that had legitimized ethnic hierarchy (Frederickson,
1990), the growth of the desegregation movement in the United States (e.g., Clark, 1953), the mass movement created by the development of World War II and the Holocaust (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), and the twentieth century quest for universal human rights and equality in social and political independence (e.g., Fanon, 1963). Latin America, the subdiscipline of social psychology was born precisely out of a desire to contribute to social justice (see Motowidlo & Byers, 2013; Ross, Loper, & West, 2010). The early pioneers of social psychology sought to produce knowledge that could explain the pathology of injustice, whether it was Theodore Adorno and colleagues' (1950) landmark study to determine what made an authoritarian, Gordon Allport's (1954) efforts to explain prejudice as a natural outgrowth of racial segregation, or Stanley Milgram's (1963) portrait of obedience to authority, even in the face of potentially lethal shocks to administration. Kurt Lewin, one of social psychology's founders, insisted that our science and our application to social and political relevance be ever interwoven, so that we may contribute not just to knowledge but also to the amelioration of social problems and the betterment of social relations (e.g., Lewin, 1951). John Dollard (1937) and Marie Jahoda and colleagues (1933) revealed the psychological consequences of economic stress and injustice. These early social psychologists were actively involved in social change efforts, particularly in the case of desegregation, and the studies and testimonies of psychologists such as Kenneth and Mamie Clark proved highly influential in eliminating unjust, explicitly racist laws (Clark, 1953; see Frie, 2004). Well over a half-century after these groundbreaking attempts of social psychologists to work for social justice and to promote a democratic society, injustice has entered a renewed era of heightened visibility and unabashed justicification. Racism not only endures through implicit bias, it is manifest in open acts of violence. The thematic and open expression of white nationalism and other discourses of social exclusion were given new legitimacy with the election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States in 2016. During the election, sexual assault and violence against women were excused and compartmentalized as "lockers-room talk." The rise of authoritarianism and xenophobia has eclipsed across the globe like a tidal wave, discrediting linear narratives of "progress" and shocking social and scientific conventions (including most social psychologists) who have made it their life's work to advocate for equality and social justice. The politics of the day and the historical events of the recent past should be a wake-up call for social psychology. The decade-long enhancement with the cognitive revolution led many away from the study of pressing social problems (Greggen, 1980). The guiding thesis of this volume is that a social psychology of the twenty-first century must reengage in the study of pressing social problems—and that this is possible not through the invocation of simplistic actions against injustice—not simply producing knowledge with "implications" for the eradication of injustice, but rather by engaging the tools of science to reestablish the social and cultural destabilization of ideologies and social structures that produce inequalities. We must integrate both privilege and dispossession (e.g., Smidt, Fox, & Frie, 2012; Weis & Frie, 2012). We must be clear, as Lewin, Allport, Milgram, Jahoda, Mamie and Kenneth Clark, and their contemporaries were, it is our commitment to the values of social justice and the opposition to the legacies of authoritarianism and ethnocentric ideologies. Our value is not sources of "bias" in the illusory quest for universal "true." Rather, social psychologists' scientific enterprise is the development, within a moral vision that maximizes human freedom and challenges the injustice of constraint (e.g., Smith, 1969). When we fail fully in our consciousness and fully acknowledged, our values enrich our attempts to analyze, critique, and influence the social world (Kelman, 1968). How do we achieve this released mission? What role do or can we social psychologists assume today in the ongoing struggle for social justice around the globe? What paradigms, theories, and practices equip us to produce knowledge that can contribute to social change in the interest of justice and equality? The impetus for this handbook is a growing awareness that many of mainstream social psychology's paradigms and research practices are heavily disengaged from actual settings of injustice. We struggle with limited, clearly articulated alternatives to certified laboratory experimentation so to analytic approaches that eliminate psychopathology in favor of the study of variables. This enfeeblement of the person as a central unit of analysis sends a message to budding social psychologists. Donald Trump is proudly placed in the field out of a desire to study people rather than variables, that abstractions in the form of scientific laws are more important than understanding lived experience in social situations. I am not advocating, nor does a social psychology of social justice require, that we abandon experimentation (e.g., Oponton, 2018), Norms of justice guide us in an order of charting lawful regularities. It seems likely that many exist, including the universality of domination, oppression, and injustice. But what social psychology needs is at this juncture not an enhancement of research on such topics as social psychology, community psychology, participatory action research, and qualitative psychology have gained momentum but essentially created their own, sometimes marginal niches—it is a blueprint for how to think about social psychology and social justice for a new century. This "new" social justice is one in which "old" problems such as exis- tence, sexism, and heteronormism remain but a new consciousness about larger bases of inequality— particularly political and economic inequality in a context of cultural and economic globalization—has risen. There have been calls for psychology to become "less American" (Arnott, 2008) and less focused on "WEIRD" (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). A social psychology of social justice recognizes that injustice is a global phenomenon that commands a global lens to our theoretical and empirical work. In this introductory chapter to this volume, I propose five critical principles to orient a social psychology of social justice for the twenty-first century. I first review the concepts of social justice and its historic emergence from Enlightenment-era shifts in social organization and political and economic philosophy. I then further situate the history of social psychology as a distinct intellectual (and political) project founded upon social justice issues of the twentieth century. I present the five principles and discuss their embodiment in existing as potential empirical work and in other chapters in the volume. In the remainder of the chapters, I provide a conceptual roadmap to the volume, situating the contributions in larger areas of theory and research on social justice. The Idea (and Ideal) of Social Justice A concern for justice is central to the fabric of all human societies and has been since ancient times (Johnson, 2011). Ideas about justice presedge the moral and political thought of human beings, the nature of social relations, and the structure of all societies (Young, 1990). Shared notions of justice determine the conduct of our judgment of the conduct of others. They are integral to our formulation of the law and to our shared moral compass—simply put, what we as a collective view as "good" and "bad." (Frye, 2011). Precisely because social justice is a concern for justice, we give up on the aim of charting lawful regularities. (It seems likely that many exist, including the universality of domination, oppression, and injustice.) But what social psychology needs is at this juncture not an enhancement of research on such topics as social psychology, community psychology, participatory action research, and qualitative psychology have gained momentum but essentially created their own, sometimes marginal niches—it is a blueprint for how to think about social psychology and social justice for a new century. This "new" social justice is one in which "old" problems such as exist- tence, sexism, and heteronormism remain but a new consciousness about larger bases of inequality— particularly political and economic inequality in a context of cultural and economic globalization—has risen. There have been calls for psychology to become "less American" (Arnott, 2008) and less focused on "WEIRD" (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). 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Anchored in a view of the social world in which hierarchies between social groups were legitimized (e.g., slavery), early philosophers of justice tended to naturalize social inequality. For example, Plato saw inequalities as reflective of different capacities among groups. He viewed social policies such as the philosopher-rulers, soldiers, merchants) as rooted in natural endowments and justice as a matter of a harmonious social order in which members of each class conformed to their "natural" social position (e.g., Aristotle, 1998). Theory of distribution justice highlighted the relative status of parties engaged in an exchange of goods but never questioned the basis on which distributions in status might be arbitrary or the product of historic domination of some groups over others. An intellectual concern with justice was revived in the moral and political philosophy of the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment, but now with an explicit emphasis on private property and other concepts central to capitalism. For example, Hume (1739) emphasized the importance of private property in his treatment of justice and the social order. Smith (1776) argued that the central goal of society ought to be the creation of wealth and that justice should be oriented toward this end. Bentham's (1789) emphasis on laws and social policies that maximize the happiness of citizens, similar to Smith and other utilitarian philosophers, assumed a correlation between wealth and happiness. Kant's (1781, 1785, 1797) deontologi- cal theory of justice rejected utilitarianism's emphasis on happiness in favor of a view of justice that emphasized the rational, free, and acentric nature of human beings (see Johnson, 2011). Consistent with the idealism of other Enlightenment thinkers, Kant envisioned a strong state defined by a view of justice in which social relations of mutual respect and reciprocity thrive among free and equal citizens (Johnson, 2011). Moral and political philosophers began to turn their attention explicitly to matters of social justice in the nineteenth century, as the growth of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution created new contexts for life, labor, and social relations. It was in this era that two competing political philosophies of justice emerged and continue to define our ideological horizon to this day. These competing philosophies diverged in their view of capitalism and its implications for social justice and human welfare. Nineteenth-century philosophers positioned against capitalism, such as Thomas Malthus (1804/2008) and Herbert Spencer (1892), viewed social justice
1990), the growth of the desegregation movement in the United States (e.g., Clark, 1953), the historic legal action prompted by the degradations (e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 1954), and the twentieth century quest for universal human rights and political independence (e.g., Fanon, 1961; Leisi, 2004), the subdiscipline of social psychology was born precisely out of a desire to contribute to social justice (see Morawski & Byers, 2013; Ross, Lappe, & Wurt). The early pioneers of social psychology sought to produce knowledge that could explain the pathology of injustice, whether it was Theodore Adorno and colleagues' (1950) landmark study to determine what makes an authoritarian, Gordon Allport's (1954) efforts to explain prejudice as a normal outgrowth of racial segregation, or Stanley Milgram's (1963) portrait of obedience to authority, even in the face of potentially lethal shock administration. Kurt Lewin, one of social psychology's founders, insisted that our science and our application and social relevance be ever intermingled, so that we may contribute not just to knowledge but also to the amelioration of social problems and the betterment of social relations (e.g., Lewin, 1951). John Dollard (1937) and Marie Jahoda and colleagues (1933) revealed the psychological consequences of economic stress and injustice. These early social psychologists were actively involved in social change efforts, particularly in the case of desegregation, and the studies and testimonies of psychologists such as Kenneth and Mamie Clark, proved highly influential in eliminating unjust, explicitly racist laws (Clark, 1953; see Fine, 2004).

Well over a half-century after these groundbreaking attempts of social psychologists to work for social justice and to promote a democratic society, injustice has entered a renewed era of heightened visibility and unabashed justicification. Racism not only endures through implicit bias, it is manifest in open acts of violence. The rhetoric and open expression of white nationalism and other discourses of social exclusion were given new legitimacy with the election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States in 2016. During the election, sexual assault and violence against women were excused and omnipresent as "locker-room talk." The reprieve of antemortem and antemortem narratives of "progress" and shrinking social and scientific gaps (including most social psychologists) who have made it their life's work to advocate for equality and social justice.

The politics of the day and the historical events of the recent past should be a wake-up call for social psychology and the enhancement with the cognitive revolution led many away from the study of pressing social problems (Gergen, 1981). The guiding thesis of this volume is that a social psychology of the twenty-first century must reengage in social activism working against injustice—not simply producing knowledge with "implications" for the eradication of injustice, but rather using the tools of science to reveal the social and cultural devastation of ideologies and social structures that produce inequalities. We must interrogate both privilege and dispossession (e.g., Smoak, Fox, & Fine, 2012; Weis & Fine, 2012). We must be clear, as Lewin, Allport, Milgram, Jahoda, Mamie and Kenneth Clark, and their contemporaries were, it is our commitment to the values of social justice and the opposition to the legacies of authoritarian and ethnocentric ideologies. Our values are not sources of "bias" in the illusory quest for universal "truth." Rather, we endeavor to humanize our scientific enterprise, whether it be in a moral vision that maximizes human freedom and challenges the injustices of constraint (e.g., Smith, 1960). When we become firmly in our consciousness and fully acknowledged, our values enrich our attempts to analyze, critique, and influence the social world (Kleinman, 1986).

How do we achieve this reserved mission? What role do or can we social psychologists assume today in the ongoing struggle for social justice around the globe? What paradigms, theories, and practices equip us to produce knowledge that can contribute to social change in the interest of justice and equality? The imperatives for this handbook are a growing awareness that many of mainstream social psychology's paradigms and research practices are heavily disengaged from actual settings of injustice. We struggle with limited, clearly articulated alternatives to current laboratory instrumentation or to analytic approaches that eliminate personhood in favor of the study of variables. This enures the person as a central unit of analysis sends a message to budding social psychologists, and Trump as President to the field out of a desire to study people rather than variables, that abstractions in the form of scientific laws are more important than understanding lived experience in social relations. I am not advocating, nor does it social psychology of social justice require, that we abandon experimenting in the laboratory (e.g., Oponent, 2018). Nox of justice guide us we give up on the aim of charting lawful regularities. (It seems likely that many exist, including the universality of domination, oppression, and injustice.) But what social psychology needs at this juncture is a model of research such as critical psychology, community psychology, participatory action research, and qualitative psychology have garner momentum but essentially created their own, sometimes marginal niches—an blueprint for how to think about social psychology and social justice for a new century. This new century is one in which "old" problems such as eusism and eusthenicism remain but a new consciousness about larger layers of inequality—particularly political and economic inequality in a context of cultural and economic globalization—has risen. There have been calls for psychology to become "less American" (Arnott, 2008) and less focused on "WEIRD" (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). A social psychology of social justice recognizes that injustice is a social phenomenon that commands a global lens to our theoretical and empirical work.

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The Idea (and Ideal) of Social Justice

A concern for justice is central to the fabric of all human societies and has been since ancient times (Johnson, 2011). Ideas about justice procure the moral ground on which societies organize. Hence, the nature of social relations, and the structure of all societies (Young, 1990). Shared notions of justice determine our conduct and our judgment of the conduct of others. They are integral to our formulation of the law and to our societal moral compass—simply put, what we as a collective view as "good" and "bad." (e.g., Oponent, 2018). Notions of justice guide us toward a life of virtue, of character, of happiness within a polity (e.g., Aristotle, 1988).

Anchored in a view of the social world in which hierarchies between social groups were legitimized (e.g., slavery), early philosophies of justice tended to naturalize social inequality. For example, Plato saw inequalities as reflective of different capacities among groups. He viewed social positions as a form of natural hierarchy (Johnson, 2011). Aristotle's (1985) theory of distributive justice highlighted the relative status of parties engaged in an exchange of goods but never questioned the basis on which distinctions in status might be arbitrary or the product of historic domination of some groups over others.

An intellectual concern with justice was revived in the moral and political philosophy of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, but now with a explicit emphasis on private property and other concepts central to capitalism. For example, Hume (1739) emphasized the importance of private property in his treatment of justice and the social order. Smith (1776) argued that the central goal of societies ought to be the creation of wealth and that justice should be oriented toward this end. Bentham's (1789) emphasis on laws and social policies that maximize the happiness of citizens, similar to Smith and other utilitarian philosophers, assumed a correlation between wealth and happiness. Kant's (1781, 1785, 1797) deontological theory of justice rejected utilitarianism's emphasis on happiness in favor of a view of justice that emphasized the rational, free, and agnostic nature of human beings (see Johnson, 2011). Consistent with the idealism of other Enlightenment thinkers, Kant envisioned a strong state defined by a view of justice in which social relations of mutual respect and reciprocity thrive among free and equal citizens (Johnson, 2011).

Moral and political philosophers began to turn their attention explicitly to matters of social justice in the nineteenth century, as the growth of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution created new contexts for life, labor, and social relations. It was in this era that two competing political philosophies of justice emerged and continue to define our ideological horizon to this day. These competing philosophies diverged in their view of capitalism and its implications for social justice and human welfare. Nineteenth-century political philosophers argued for capitalism, such as Thomas Malthus (1800/2008) and Herbert Spencer (1892), viewed social justice
through a "principle of desert"—the idea that what individuals deserve to receive is based on what they contribute to society (Johnston, 2011). The ideology of meritocracy and the master narrative of the "American Dream" (Bullock, 2013), in which hard work is sufficient to secure considerable social mobility for individuals, are linked to this principle. The larger social and economic structure of neoliberalism, which points the benefits of private property, free market and individual and collective wellbeing (Harvey, 2005), can also be linked to the principle of desert.

By contrast, nineteenth century philosophers who challenged capitalism, such as Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (e.g., Marx, 1867/1992; Marx & Engels, 1848/2014), viewed social justice through a "principle of need"—best captured in the famous phrase, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," attributed to nineteenth century scholar and activist Louis Blanc (Johnston, 2011). The Marxist perspective of socialism and communism as alternative systems of social and economic organization captured a concern for social justice, particularly economic justice, to the forefathers of global consciousness and inspired revolutions everywhere (e.g., Guevara, Luxemburg, Marx, & Engels, 2005). The basis for justice and equality was no longer intrinsically tied to one's social position, as it was until the Enlightenment. Nor was it contingent upon one's place in the process of material production, as it was in the minds of philosophers such as Spencerc. Rather, human existence in and of itself warranted equality and dignity across communities. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these ideas became intrinsically linked to the struggle against not just economic injustice but also larger concerns with injustice on the basis of race (e.g., Wills, 2014) and gender (e.g., Addams, 1910).

Importantly, Marx linked capitalism and its construction of the material world according to mass production and commodification to the psychiatric experience of alienation, thus providing not only a political and economic critique on the inherent injustices of capitalism, but also a deeply psychological one.

The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men [et] that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. (Mars, 1859/1973, p. 9)

Marx challenged inherited ideas about free will and individual liberty and responsibility for the prior notions of justice, particularly in the Enlightenment, though it is noteworthy that he failed to fully incorporate the consciousness of elites. If the view in which the social and political order is constructed is fundamentally a product of social and economic organization, societies have an obligation to structure themselves in a manner that promotes justice and equality.

Marx's emphasis on the power of the social and economic order to shape human consciousness forms the basis for contemporary perspectives on social justice that emphasize liberation from historical oppression (e.g., Freire, 1970/2000; Young, 1990). Social justice scholarship in social psychology interrogates the basis upon which (a) resources are distributed and available to diverse groups in societies (i.e., distributive justice e.g., Deach, 1985), (b) decisions are made about the distribution of resources (i.e., procedural justice e.g., Lund & Tyler, 1988), and (c) groups are included or excluded in visions of a larger moral community (i.e., inclusion/exclusionary justice e.g., Openpit, 1990, 2018) as transformative (Spence, 2010) justice. The emphasis on groups in these considerations of justice takes us out of the individuum of Enlightenment-era formulations and the abstractation of Rawls's (1971) "original position" of equality into the concrete reality of historical domination (Young, 1990). Hence our ideas of social justice are informed by our historical understanding of oppression and domination (and, as we will suggest, our explicit alliance with the subordinate) and a critical perspective on the social structure of society. Central to current formulations of social justice is an analysis of power, for social justice requires a concept of empowerment in which individuals and groups are fully capable of determining their destinies (e.g., Prato, 2016; Rapaport, 1981; Zimmerman, 2000).

The idea of social justice that orients this volume thus centers on themes of, thus and is not only a political and economic critique on the inherent injustices of capitalism, but also a deeply psychological one.

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By contrast, nineteenth-century philosophers who challenged capitalism, such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (e.g., Marx, 1867/1992; Marx & Engels, 1848/2014), viewed social justice through a "principle of need" — captured in the famous phrase, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," attributed to nineteenth-century scholar and activist Louis Blanc (Johnston, 2011). The idea of desert is fostered by the principles of capitalism and consumerism as alternative systems of social and economic organization. The absence of desert fosters a community or society, justified by the way in which individuals are distributed and available to diverse groups in society, in which the principle of need is fostered by the interests of individuals and groups who are excluded or excluded in the context of a larger moral context (e.g., minority/led by Brown, 2007, pp. 1-2).

A society characterized by a commitment to social justice considers the well-being of all in its inhabitants, unchallenged by the constraints of oppression and domination or the intimidation of authoritarianism. It is a society in which individuals and groups are free to express themselves and determine their own identities, practicing an ethic of social responsibility.

In contrast to prior notions of justice that legitimized hierarchy (e.g., Plato) or inequality (e.g., Spengler), contemporary notions of social justice subscribe to the vision of cultural pluralism in which differences between groups are recognized, appreciated, and celebrated (e.g., Young, 1990). Social and economic success for all is linked to the extent to which groups in various societies are afforded "cultural liberty" — the capacity of people to live and be who they choose, with adequate opportunity to consider other options (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2004, p. 4).

Conflict, power, and war are all linked to grievances associated with oppression in all its forms — exploitation, marginalization, cultural imperialism, powerlessness, and violence (Young, 1990). A commitment to social justice necessitates a repudiation of oppression in all its forms and the creation of institutions that recognize and value group differences (Young, 1990).

This vision of social justice calls our attention to the ideological basis of political, cultural, and economic systems (e.g., capitalism, neoliberalism; see Liberov, 2015); the biases of these systems and their effects on particular groups (e.g., slavery, colonialism; see Sibley & Adams, 2013). The twin methodologies and discourses that sustain these ideologies (e.g., the American Dream, the Procrustean work ethic; see Bullock, 2013) the social psychological mechanisms by which individuals and groups either repudiate or repudiate the status quo (e.g., conformity, Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), system justification (e.g., Just & Hyman, 2003), and engagement (e.g., Hammack, 2008); and of the effects of all these processes on the body, the mind, the "soul." Social psychologists who anchor their work in a commitment to social justice provide knowledge at some place along this trajectory, investigating the way in which individuals and groups maintain or challenge an existing order through psychological mechanisms and processes.

With this vision of social justice in mind, in the next section I outline five principles to guide social justice research and practice in the twenty-first century. Some of these principles have been implicit in social psychological inquiry for some time. Others speak to a uniquely twenty-first-century context, in which technology has forged new means of communication and the deployment of discourse. My aim here is to provide a synthesis of values and practices already in place but fragmental across the subdisciplines of psychology (and the social sciences more broadly) concerned with matters of social justice. Following an outline of these principles, I present a roadmap to the volume and the domains of injustice covered by contributors.

Principles of a Social Psychology of Social Justice

Principle 1: Critical Ontology

The first principle of a social psychology of social justice proposes that research be anchored in a critical ontological perspective, taking as its underlying premise that social theory a view of the subject as socially and historically constituted, always in relation to systems of power and domination (see Foucault, 1982; see Hoek, 2007; Yates & Ellis, 2010). This perspective, inspired especially by the work of Michel Foucault, recognizes that knowledge, institutions, and systems of authority are essential to a society and also regulate the psychology of lived experience, including the meaning of social categories such as the "insane," the "prisoner," or the "homeless". To name three social categories Foucault studied extensively (Foucault, 1965, 1977, 1978). A critical ontological perspective recognizes power
and knowledge as intimately connected to individual psychology and the enterprise of social psychology. In this sense, knowledge production is an industry that, with its scientific authority, might contribute to social injustice (as it did during the eugenics movement (Richards, 1997) or the period during which mental hygiene was classified as a moral illness (Hammack, Mayes, & Windle, 2013; Hesse, 2010), or more recently the participation of psychologists in torture (Oppezzo, 2007) or to social justice in general (e.g., Clark & Gray, 1953; Fine, 2004), critical perspectives on colonialism (e.g., Fanon, 1961/2004), the eventual alliance with liberal, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTQ) people for rights and recognition (see Hesse, 2018), and other examples). Situating social psychology within the critical human sciences (e.g., Foucault, 1979; Plattner, 2001; Pollitt/Aunor, 1888) represents a first step to produce knowledge explicitly oriented toward social justice.

A critical ontological perspective alludes social psychology more closely with other philosophical approaches that assume a stance of suspicion about the social world, rather than a faith in the social structure as reflecting some "natural" order (Teo, 2015; see Joselous, 2004). Inspired as well by critical social theory (e.g., Brunner & Keliness, 1989; Feld, 1980) and the critical psychology movement (e.g., Fry, Pilsens, & Aunor, 2001), both of which emphasize the link between ideology and knowledge production, this perspective brings social psychology into more direct dialogue with critical paradigms such as feminist standpoint theory (e.g., Harding, 2004), postmodern and post-structural social theory (e.g., Butler, 1990; Gergen, 2001), and social constructionism (e.g., Gergen, 1985). A social justice perspective supplants the traditional positivist or post-positivist epistemology with an interpretive, constructivist epistemology that views knowledge about the social world as inherently linked to power and history (Hammack & Tools, 2016; see also Sampson, 1978). A critical ontology for social psychology necessitates a fundamental rethinking of our scientific enterprise as essentially producing historical knowledge (Gergen, 1973), rather than the illusion that the knowledge we obtain possesses some kind of universal "truth" or last word. This paradigmatic position can be traced to the founding of psychological science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when psychology's early practitioners disagreed about whether psychology ought to be considered a "natural science" (e.g., James, 1890) or a "human science" (e.g., Dilthey, 1894/1977). The former approach suggested a positivist epistemology in which the goal was to produce scientific laws and discover generalities throughout most of the social sciences (e.g., film, literature, propaganda). We consider not just an individual's expression of prejudiced representations of human nature. We produce knowledge that reveals the injustice of that cultural context which promulgates the perpetuation of prejudice, not simply knowledge that pathologizes individual perpetrators of prejudice.

Second, a critical ontological perspective leads us to a suspicion of the social structure, with its matrix of social categories—truly detrimental for both social relations and the psychological life of the individual (e.g., Brewer, 2001; Reichert, 2004; Tajfel, 1978, 1981, 1982). As Foucault espoused the way in which social categories were not products of a "natural" order but rather constructed through discourse that were ultimately intended to control individual behavior (e.g., Foucault, 1978), psychological science must also embrace a critical ontological perspective to consider the nature of social categories themselves (Reichert & Hopkins, 2001). Socialism and social identity theories have produced research in social psychology that explicitly speaks to this phenomenon (e.g., Haney, 2005, 2006; Tajfel, 1981; Zimbardo, 2007), although explicit links between Foucault's ideas and these findings have rarely been acknowledged.

While the findings of canonical experiments in social psychology were originally interpreted to reveal propositional of human nature to collaborate in tyranny and violence (e.g., Milgram, 1963, 1974; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Zimbardo, 2007), recent reassessments have revealed the way in which participants were motivated by both ideologically informed and social structural forces (including solidarity ideologies). As Zimbardo (2015) explains the way in which psychological science is itself inherently interpretive, its data always subject to the lens of the era and its manifold social structural forces (including solidarity ideologies) provide a critical corrective to the way in which psychological science is itself inherently interpretive, its data always subject to the lens of the era and its manifold social structural forces (including solidarity ideologies) provide a critical corrective to the way in which psychological science is itself inherently interpretive, its data always subject to the lens of the era and its manifold social structural forces (including solidarity ideologies) provide a critical corrective.
and knowledge as intimately connected to individual psychology and the emergence of social psychologies. The knowledge produced in this way, that is, with its scientific authority, might contribute to social injustice as it did during the eugenics movement (Richards, 1997) or the period during which psychoanalytic theory was classified as a mental dis-

The desirability of psychological science perceived as a way to achieve social change and knowledge that is scientifically oriented toward social justice. A critical ontological perspective allies social psychological research closely with other philosophical approaches that assume a stance of suspicion about the social world, rather than a faith in the social structure as reflecting some "natural" order (Foucault, 2015; see Jasson, 2006). Inspired as well by critical social theory (e.g., Brunner & Keller, 1989; Held, 1980) and the critical psychology movement (e.g., see P. Freire, 1970; Azevedo, 2007), both of which emphasize the link between ideology and social psychology, this perspective brings social psychology into more direct dialogue with critical psychologies such as feminist standpoint theo-

in group by group by group (e.g., Hammer & Wood, 2016). —proposes forms of subjectivity that either reproduce or resist unjust social order. To return from theoretical abstraction to a critical problem of the moment—the reprise of authoritarianism and white nationalism—a social psychology of social justice considers the social and historical context in which these ideologies have regressed momentarily. It examines the way in which discourses are deployed to activate social psychological processes of identification, obedience, conformity, prejudice, and violence. It seeks to expose the strategic use of language and emotion to influence the masses. It mobilizes insights and ideas from decades of social psychology and related disciplines to return to the original questions that motivated the enterprise from the start. How do rational human beings, with faith in the ideals of law and democracy, embrace ideologies of exclusion? Like situationists and social identity theorists, we look to the social structure and to the strategic deployment of discourse to position ideologies and social categories in relative terms of authority. We then look to the individual and the way in which ideologies and discourses are internalized. The explicit embrace of a critical ontolog-

The claim to a value-free science . . . only obscures the value elements in the choice of problem, of research setting, of conceptual framework, in the decision to ask certain questions and not to ask others, in the selection of a context for measurement, and in the decision to test a hypothesis in one way and not another.
The second principle I suggest ought to guide the social psychology of social justice in the twenty-first century is that people care in need of little elaboration. Social psychologists have long studied the role of norms in human behavior and intergroup relations (e.g., Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1973; Sherman, 1974). We have long understood that individuals and groups develop standards of thought and action to provide meaning and social reality. But we often also refer to norms as social scientists. We have used our common sense standards of practice to guide our social enterprise and our production of knowledge about the social world. We often speak of our norms in terms of epistemology, methodology, or basic scientific practice, but as a community of scholars we also share a normative sense about the social world. We share a vision—sometimes shared—as the ideal configuration of social relations. We study social practices such as prejudice, hypocrisi, stereotyping, conformity, conformity, and conflict with implicit or explicit assumptions about the value of these processes. We teach about what is socially acceptable, and in the Stanford Prison Experiment with, just as these researchers position their findings, shock and awe at the darkest directions a social context can take the individual, away from morality and reason. We constitute our own moral community.

Social psychology emerged at a time of war and crisis on both domestic and global fronts in the twenty-first century (De Voo, 2010; Mouwari & Beyer, 2013; Ross et al., 2010). Colonialism, racism, and ideologies of ethnic hierarchy proliferated in the early days of the discipline. Far from a neutral scientific enterprise, social psychology was part of a cultural movement to resist these pernicious ideologies and their consequences for the social structure. Decisions to focus on phenomena such as authoritarianism, prejudice, conformity, and intergroup relations did not occur in a cultural vacuum but rather came from individuals deeply committed to a more just and democratic world (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Lewin, 1948; Milgram, 1968; Pettigrew, 1961; Tajfel, 1981).

In the twenty-first century, social psychologists continue to work on many of the same problems, yet these problems are often relaxed to acknowledge the social scientific activities that propel us. I propose that we "come out" from behind the veil of old, discarded notions of scientific "objectivity" (Haraway, 1988) and finally allow ourselves to acknowledge psychological truth is not something necessarily occurring "out there" to be grasped, but rather something that is dynamic, constructed in and through social relations between persons in concrete sociocultural settings.

(1980. p. 1334)

It should come as no surprise that the version of social psychology I advocate—and the version represented in the current volume—is situated in Sampson's (1978) "Paradigm II." We reject the notion that social psychology benefits from political diversity or ideological neutrality because we assume that the basis of social injustice is political and ideological. Social justice is not merely relative. It is guided by fundamental notions of justice and moral norms that we, as the producers of knowledge, have a right to define. Sampson's shared goal is not a prestigious science, viewed from the outside as producing context-free "Truths." Rather, our shared goal is a just society—be it a society of Enlightenment or a society with"liberal progress narratives" (Smith, 2003; see Duarte et al., 2015). The rejection of the assumption of a normative stance against injustice look like in our empirical research: In many ways it only calls us to amplify what is sometimes implicit in our writing and in our other forms of scientific communication. A social psychology of social justice recognizes that a strong and explicit stance against injustice enables our ability to work for social justice (Khazan, 1968; Smith, 1969), for in clearly positions us as allied with the subordinate.

Principle 3: Alliance with the Subordinate

In the nineteenth century, a new social category or "type of person" emerged from the medical and scientific discourse. With the unification of Germany out of the former Prussian Empire, existing legal codes pertaining to sexual behavior began to come into conflict. A movement of sex law reformers and scientists created a new vocabulary to understand sexual diversity when they invented the terms "homosexual" and "heterosexual" to describe distinct types of people (Bullock, 1979; Katz, 2007). With this suggestive invention came a whole new social category—the homosexual—taken out of the realm of the criminal and into the world of medicine, science, and culture (Foucault, 1978).

[...]

... Scientific facts and scientific truths, as well as all other forms of knowledge, are said to be intrinsically connected to the practice of language and social categorization. Psychology has gradually come to explicitly ally itself with the social and psychological well-being of sexual minorities (Hammack & Leverett, 2020). It has been a collective struggle against between persons in concrete sociocultural settings. (Sampson, 1980, p. 1334)
The second principle I suggest ought to guide the social psychology of social justice in the twenty-first century is a simple one in need of little elaboration. Social psychologists have long studied the social behavior of individuals in human behavior and intergroup relations (e.g., Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1991; Sherif, 1936). We have long interrogated the way in which individuals and groups develop standards of thought and action to provide meaning and order to collective life. But we ourselves are also guided by norms as social scientists. We have developed our own common standards of practice to guide our scientific enterprise and our production of knowledge about the social world. We often speak of our norms in terms of epistemology, methodology, or basic scientific practice, but as a community of scholars we also share a normative stance about the social world. We share a vision—sometimes utopian—of the ideal configuration of social relations. We study social processes such as prejudice, stereotyping, authoritarianism, conformity, and conflict—always with implicit or explicit assumptions about the value of these processes. We teach about Milgram’s obedience experiments and the Stanford Prison Experiment with just as those researchers positioned their findings, shock and abuse as the dark side—now a social context can take the individual, away from morality and reason. We constitute our own mental community.

Social psychology emerged as a time of war and chaos and both domestic and global fronts in the twentieth century (De Vos, 2016; Morawski & Beyer, 2018; Roux et al., 2010). Colonialism, racism, and ideologies of ethnic hierarchy proliferated in the early days of the discipline. Far from a neutral scientific enterprise, social psychology was part of a cultural movement to resist these pernicious ideologies and their consequences for the social structure. Decisions to focus on phenomena such as authoritarianism, prejudice, conformity, and intergroup relations did not occur in a cultural vacuum but rather came from individuals deeply committed to a more just and democratic world (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Lewis, 1948; Milgram, 1963; Pettigrew, 1961; Tafel, 1981). In the early twenty-first century, social psychologists continue to work on many of the same problems, yet too often we are resistant to acknowledge the scientific activism that propels us. I propose that we "remember the face behind the veil of old" and discard notions of scientific "objectivity" (Haraway, 1988) and embrace our collective stance against injustice and oppression in all its forms. We reject the notion that social psychology ought to be something ideologically "balanced" or "neutral" or that our endeavor somehow benefits from "political diversity" (Duarte et al., 2015). This notion is premised on a view that desecrates the politics of all knowledge production and hence favors view with greater power. The social world is not ideologically neutral but rather is the product of historical forces characterizing individuals and groups (e.g., American Psychological Association and American Sociological Association, 1937). Ethno-cultural ideology is heavily intertwined throughout the social world (e.g., Hamann et al., 2013; Richards, 1997; Shields, 2007; Shields & Bhn, 2009). Social psychology aims to explicitly reproduce the complexity of science with oppressive ideologies over the course of the twentieth century. And it is difficult to comprehend recent calls for enhanced "political diversity" (Duarte et al., 2015) within the field, given that social psychological science has been an explicitly political project from its inception.

Sampson's (1978) compelling perspective on paradigms in social psychology reveals its contemporary relevance in this matter. It is noteworthy that this article is routinely cited by my first-year doctoral students in their entry paper as an example of how to write a social psychology paper. Sampson (1978) argues that the nature of science presents value orientations and that psychology has been divided between two paradigms with conflicting value orientations: the natural science model, and the historical model, harkening again back to psychology's founders and the divisions between James' "natural science" and Dilthey's "human science" conception. Sampson (1978) suggests that the natural science (or "Paradigm I") model is in line with values of "liberalism, individualism, capitalism, and male dominance" (p. 1355). He suggests that this is a result of its emergence in the modern sciences. In this dominant culture of Western science, the liberal values of science ("Paradigm I") model views itself as a social science from a context-dependent and hence always culturally and politically embedded.

1. Social psychologists are interested in social justice and social status. The mixing of social status and social justice is something that is dynamic and not always the same. For instance, in the most of the twenty-first century, social psychologists continued to maintain the subordinates, marginalized status of individuals with non-heterosexual desires and identities (Hamrack et al., 2015). While psychologistic dedicated their cause to recognizing the homo sexual and seeking a "care" for their "all"ments, most psychologists studied the use of tests to detect members of this often invisible population (Minton, 1986). Common psychological tools such as the Rorschach were re-envisioned for a purpose for which they were never intended: to detect the "deviates" (Hegar, 2005).

It would take a disciplinary insider, using the established tools of science and the very ideas about the power of psychological tests to detect mental illness, to begin to mobilize psychological science for the betterment, rather than continued subordination, of sexual minorities. Evelyn Hooker's (1957) highly influential study revealed that expert assays of clinical texts could not distinguish between groups of male homosexuals and heterosexuals. The results were interpreted to mean that male homosexuality in itself did not constitute psychopathology and that homosexuality ought to be considered a "normal" form of sexual diversity. It would take well over another decade for homosexuality to be removed from psychiatry's diagnostic manual, and hence from the vocabulary of mental illness, now cast by scientific authority as a legitimate sexual identity rather than a diagnosable mental condition. Yet one step was essentially absolute to the eventual move toward social justice for sexual minorities (Bayer, 1987; Minster, 2001).

The story of Evelyn Hooker is the story of a scientific activist whose personal alliance with the stigmatized community of homosexuals motivated her to use her scientific authority for social justice (see Hooker, 1993). Herself heterosexual, it was Hooker's personal relationships with gay men and lesbians (in particular a former student of hers who was gay and introduced her to the gay community of Los Angeles in the 1950s) that motivated her to take the enormous cultural and professional risk to conduct a series of studies (including an ethnographic study; Hooker, 1967) that explicitly challenged the cultural and scientific authority of the day. Through her engagement with a non-clinical community of sexual minorities, it was plain to her that homosexuality did not inherently comport psychological functioning. (Alfred Kinsey assumed a very similar role to Hooker, though he was more identified with sociology than psychology at that time). Rather, it was society's treatment of sexual diversity that created problems for homosexuals.
Like Evelyn Hooker in her time, social psycholo-
gists today face a choice as we investigate injustices in the world for social justice, always aligning ourselves with those who experience injustice, oppression, subordina-
tion, and violence against them all. A common theme in the subordina-
tion is that our alliance with the subordinate is typically implicit. When we study racial prejudice against African Americans, we are taking a stance against racism and its social psychological man-
ifestations. When we study sexual orientation, we are studying the interests of the subordi-
nate, or are our scientific practices more concerned with our own personal and professional interests to achieve success, tenure, and the like? A social psychology of social justice must do more than produce knowledge that reveals the endurance of racism among "perpetrators" or the psychological toll of racism among "victims." A genuine alliance with the subordinate requires that we consider their social interests. What kind of knowledge do they need to work for their emancipation from cultural and social self-limitation? Here we return to epistemology and methodology, for the constraints of convention in social psychological research can cripple our alliance with the subordinate or confine or limit. The methods of a social psychology of social justice benefit from a grounding in the interests of the sub-
ordinate, as we ask ourselves how to achieve our produc-
tion of knowledge may be "of use." (Fine, 2006; Fine & Barraza, 2001). Kurt Lewin (1946), one of the discipline's founders, argued for a type of "action research," famously proclaiming that "research that produces nothing but books will not suffice" (p. 35). He outlined a formula for inquiry in social psychology, one which grounds our scientific practice in the needs of the communities whose interests we serve. His legacy on this front is apparent with the emergence of participatory action research (PAR) as a whole paradigm for empirical work in its own right (e.g., Bryson-Miller, 1997; Fine et al., 2005; Fine & Torre, 2004; Fox et al., 2010; Lykes, 1997; Torre, 2009; Torre, Fine, Sniehotta, & Fox, 2012). The exploration of qualitative methods in psychology, the data of which preserves the voices of subordinate group members and hence provides narrative data that can be used as compelling evidence of the de-
humanization of nonwhite subordinates, to transmit the voices of those who are marginalized remains a powerful force. (Fraser & Suhr, 2004, 2011) or the meaning of social activities (e.g., Datt & Graber, 2014; Graber, 2017; Stewart, Lai, & McGuire, 2011) also speaks to the needs of the subordinate, integrating participatory and methodical practices probably better reflect a commitment to the interests of the subordinate, for they more directly involve those experiencing injustice in the formulation of research questions and design and they seek to understand the meas-
uring of subordinate in context (see Tolman & Bryson-Miller, 2001). We propose that our alliance with the subordinate be explicit in every aspect of the research process and that we use the tools of sci-
ence to work for the interests of the subordinate. In principle, this principle suggests that we derive our research questions and construct forms of strategic communication of our findings in collaboration with subordinate groups. Our professional identities and practices are thus characterized not by a mea-
ured detachment from the populations we study. Rather, we recognize that detachment in the illusion of "objective etic" is neither desired nor possible. We embrace our positions as privile-
gated actors whose institutional and cultural roles as academics or scientists affect social capital that is not neutralistic to the performance of the research. This precisely the role Evelyn Hooker played as a central figure in the movement for social justice for sexual minorities. And whether we are members of the subordinate group or allies (as Hooker was), insiders or outsiders, we embody our commitment to social justice through our practice as researchers.

**Principle 4: Analysis of Resistance**

In the standard introductory course in social psychology, we typically present a key finding of Milgram's (1965) classic obedience experiments to an awe-struck audience of undergraduates, experi-
encing their own peak of expressive individualism at the start of emerging adulthood (Aronson, 2000; Aronson, Carnagey, & Jensen, 2001): nearly two-thirds of subjects blindly followed the experimenter's admin-
istering of shocks to the "learner." When we discuss Asch (1955) classic line-judgment study, we also tend to emphasise the shocking number of subjects (75%) who, in a basic perceptual judgment task, yield to the social pressure of the group, illustrat-
ing the cognitive allure of conformity. In classic studies of prejudice and stereotyping, there is a historic emphasis on the perpetuation and the pathol-
gerization of "he/she/this (typically his) psych" (e.g., cigarette consumption, adopted by the US Surgeon General's report, 1971; then prostate cancer, 1973; then the Prison Experiment (Haney et al., 1973), we detail with horror how "John Wayne" was able to so easily rally the other subjects assigned as prison guards to participate. In other words, this process of increasing awareness of the psychological life of resistance, namely in the study of social move-
ments, found its disciplinary home in sociology.
Like Evelyn Hooker in her time, social psychologists today face a choice as we interrogate injustice. In 1964, she used the tools of science to work for social justice, always aligning ourselves with those who experience injustice, oppression, subordination. But not all alliances with the subordinate is typically implicit. When we study racial prejudice against African Americans, we are taking a stance against racism and its social psychological manifestations. We are striving to understand the mechanisms of the subordinate, or are our scientific practices more concerned with our own personal and professional interests to achieve success, tenure, and the like? A social psychology of social justice must do more than produce knowledge that reveals the endurance of racism among "perpetrators" or the psychological toll of racism among "victims." A genuine alliance with the subordinate requires that we consider their social interests. What kind of knowledge do they need to work for their emancipation from cultural and institutional constraints? Here we return to epistemology and methodological constraints of conventional social psychological research can compel us to keep our alliance with the subordinate confined or limited. The methods of social psychology of social justice benefit from a grounding in the interests of the subordinate, as we ask ourselves what produces knowledge that reveals the "darkside" of human nature and group life. This narrative is anchored in the social reality of deep cultural traditions, and this principle suggests that we derive our research questions and construct forms of strategic communication of our findings in collaboration with subordinate groups. Our professional identities and practices are thus characterized not by a measured detachment from the populations we study. Rather, we recognize that detachment in the illusory notion of "objectivity" is neither desired nor possible. We embrace our positions as privileged actors whose institutional and cultural roles as academics or scientists afford us social capital that we use to the advantage of the groups we study. This precisely the role Ivelyn Hooker played as a central figure in the movement for social justice for sexual minorities. And whether we are members of the subordinate group or allies (as Hooker was), insiders or outsiders, we embody our commitment to social justice through our practice as researchers.

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**Social Norms and Conformity**

Social norms are expectations about appropriate behavior that are shared by members of a group. These norms can be explicit, such as rules or laws, or implicit, such as unwritten expectations. Social norms can influence individual behavior by providing a referent for comparison and by shaping the way people interpret and respond to events. For example, social norms can influence the way people dress, speak, or behave in public settings. Social norms can also influence individual behavior by providing a source of social pressure. When people feel that they must conform to social norms in order to be accepted by their peers, they may experience social pressure to conform. Social pressure can be subtle, such as when people feel that they must conform in order to be accepted by a group, or it can be more overt, such as when people are rewarded or punished for conforming or deviating from social norms.

**The Psychology of Conformity**

There are several factors that influence the likelihood of conforming to social norms. One important factor is the strength of the social norm. The stronger the norm, the more likely people are to conform. Another important factor is the size of the group. The larger the group, the more likely people are to conform. Another important factor is the presence of authority figures. When authority figures are present, people are more likely to conform to social norms.

**The Psychology of Deviance**

Deviance refers to behavior that is considered inappropriate or unacceptable by members of a group. Deviance can be a source of social pressure, as people may feel that they must conform to social norms in order to be accepted by their peers. However, deviance can also be a source of social pressure, as people may feel that they are being judged negatively if they do not conform to social norms.

**The Psychology of Resistance**

Resistance refers to behavior that is intended to challenge or challenge social norms. Resistance can take many forms, such as civil disobedience, protest, or rebellion. Resistance can be a source of social pressure, as people may feel that they must conform to social norms in order to be accepted by their peers. However, resistance can also be a source of social pressure, as people may feel that they are being judged negatively if they do not conform to social norms.
The study of resistance has also occurred among social psychologists who study collective action in the social identity tradition. Reicher (2004) argues that collective action theory is often associated with the pursuit of processes of intergroup discrimination, while Tajfel (1970) intended the theory to be concerned with the "possibility of change" (Reicher, 2004, p. 935). Here identities are seen as "projects" that "render collective action possible" (Reicher, 2004, p. 935). If the great oversimplification revealed of social identity theory was that mere categorization is sufficient to activate ingroup bias, Reicher (2004) argues that we ought to see the construction of social categories as opening up spaces for resistance. In other words, the key insight is not about bias but rather the ease with which identities can be constructed and potentially mobilized toward collective action. A key project in resistance is thus the strategic construction of identity and its use to advocate for social and political change. "Perhaps the major strategy through which these we have termed "skepticism of identity" seek to shape collective action is to define the meanings of group identity such that their proposals can be seen as the implementation of group norms" (Reicher, 2004, p. 937). For Reicher, the term "facing identity or group life more broadly need not be viewed through the historic "dark" lens of forces of the head or the "group mind" (e.g., Freud, 1923/1959) but rather through the lens of identity as social change. Identity and political change are not necessarily in conflict but can rather be a benefit in the quest for social justice (Hammack, 2010b).

As Reicher (2004) argues, "tyranny is always being inflicted on us, even in the most extreme circumstances" (p. 941). Hence it was especially fitting that Reicher and Hammack (2006) returned to the Stanford Prison Experiment to illustrate the need to balance an emphasis on tyranny with the analytical insights that experiments can provide. In their BBC Prison Study (BPS), Reicher and Hammack (2006) discovered that, absent the leadership role that the experimenters assumed in the original experiment (Zimbardo, 1973), prisoners were able to effectively resist the authority of the guards. They illustrate how the descent into tyranny is not inevitable and how a substantial number of guards can resist the control of the prison through the collective solidarity (see also Haslam & Reicher, 2012). This study has not been without its critics (namely Zimbardo 2006) himself who noted problems with the simulation to replace a prison system, among other criticisms). But the important takeaway is that social identity theory provides us with a vocabulary to not just understand the perpetuation of injustice but also resistance against it. Hence, as a paradigm, it calls our attention to the analysis of resistance as a vital part of the social process toward justice and healing.

Here my intent is not to suggest we ought to cease study and analysis of either perpetuation of injustice or its lived experience through its victims. Rather, echoing the calls of many of my colleagues, I want to suggest that our scope expand to center the analysis of resistance. It is, doing, we recognize social structures and systems as always in a dynamic state of reproduction and epistemology (Hammack, 2018, 2011a; Hammack & Touliou, 2015). By joining sociologists in the systematic study of resistance, we offer a potentially vital contribution to the psychological factors and processes central to challenging an unjust status quo.

Principle 5: Commitment to Public Science and Scientific Activism

W.E.B. Du Bois, Kurt Lewin, Marie Jahoda, Gordon Allport, Kenneth Clark, Elizabeth Brawner, Herbert Kelman, Tom Pettigrew, Evelyn Hoolihan, Morton Deutsch, Phil Zimbardo, Craig Haney, Alda Hurtado, Ignacio Martin-Baro, Michelle Fine, Heather Hoffman, Greg Meek, Hal Meyer, Anne Peplau. What these individuals share, beyond a relation to social psychology (even if it was not their primary disciplinary "home"), is that they exerted considerable effort in their lives to work for the public interest in justice and equality—to fully be "of use" to those who experience injustice (Fine & Barterra, 2001). We must credit the work of these researchers, activists, and community self-survey movements, who fought many of the civil liberties and social justice issues of the day. All of these inspired us to conduct research on violence, prejudice, and segregation; some of them provided testimony that directly impacted the US Supreme Court's 1954 ruling that ended segregation (see Adams et al., 2008; Fine, 2006). These scholars provided both data and glimpses into the lives of individuals impacted by policies of equal importance. We must use rigorous methods that address the nature of the question to be answered, not methods that might perhaps be given greater weight in some (accessible) scholarly journal or narrow-minded community of peer reviewers (see Fine, 2006).

To be clear, my view is that we must produce scholarly work in authoritative sources such as journals and books, for that is how we obtain the credibility of expertise to actually legitimate social change. But I suggest we develop questions and utilize methods that serve the interest of our larger goal for social justice (Fine, 2006). In one case, numeric evidence obtained through quantitative surveys may be of greater value, as in the "Polling for Justice" project where you have used community surveys to map the experience of injustice in education, family life, and health care (Fine, 2011b) or [add others]. In another, narrative evidence obtained through ethnographies, interviews, or focus groups may be of more value and carry more weight to our intended audience beyond the academy (Frost, 2018; Frost & Oulette, 2004, 2001). What is key is that our scientific practice be aligned with these experiencing injustice in such a way as to work for their benefit and to expose the link between social structure and psychological injustice (Martin-Baro, 1994; Weiss & Fine, 2012).

I borrow Fine, Torres, and colleagues' use of the term public science to describe this envisioned commitment to a form of inquiry that can best serve the end of social justice. Although CUNY's Public Science Project and numerous other examples in social and community psychology are grounded in a specific methodology—namely, critical participatory action research (critical PAR), Torres & Fine, 2011; Torres et al., 2012)—a public science approach can be embodied in many forms. Hooker's (1957) pathbreaking study of gay men took the form of a quasi-experiment. Haney's long career of research in prisons has variously used ethnography, surveys, and focus groups to explore the social and psychological dynamics of【add role of:】...
I. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

(Hammack, Williams, & Hargis, 2003), consciousness seeking the development of consciousness-rising in relationships of social psychology is long discussed in feminist social psychology (e.g., Hurdley, 1989, 1996, 2003). In my own work, I have suggested that narrative identity development can be a tool to construct emancipatory life stories that challenge an unjust status quo (e.g., Hammack, 2008; Hammack & Toole, 2016). For example, many adults have never seen untreated youth construct personal narratives that challenge existing conventional categories of gender and sexual identity, resisting an inherited matrix of social identities to forge new possibilities for social and erotic life (e.g., Adams, Braun, & McCreant, 2014; Hammack & Coblentz, 2011; Hammack, Thompson, & Pilnick, 2009, 2005).

The study of resistance has also occurred among social psychologists who study collective action in the social identity tradition. Reicher (2004) argues that the power decision theory has often been used to preclude to focus on processes of intergroup discrimination, while Tajfel (1978) intended the theory to be concerned with the "possibility of change" (Reicher, 2004, p. 931). Here identities are seen as projects that "render collective action possible" (Reicher, 2004, p. 935). If the great (oversimplified) revelation of social identity theory was that mere categorization is sufficient to activate ingroup bias, Reicher (2004) argues that we ought to see the construction of social categories as opening up spaces for resistance. In other words, the key insight is not about bias but rather the ease with which identities can be constructed and potentially mobilized toward collective action. A key project in resistance is thus the strategic construction of identity and its use to advocate for social and political change. "Perhaps the major strategy through which these we have termed 'resistance' acts to shape collective action is to define the meanings of group identity such that their proposals can be seen as the implementation of group norms" (Reicher, 2004, p. 937). In other words, identity or group life more broadly need not be viewed through the historic "dark" lens of forms of the or "the group mind" (e.g., Freud, 1921/1959) but rather through the lens of the real and social change. Identity need not be necessary a burden but can rather be a benefit in the quest for social justice (Hammack, 2010b).

As Reicher (2004) argues, "tyranny is always based on, even in the most extreme circumstances" (p. 941). Hence it was especially fitting that Reicher and Hnilo (2006) returned to the Stanford Prison Experiment to illustrate the need to balance an emphasis on tyranny with the analysis of resistance to the tyranny. In their BBC Prison Study (BPS), Reicher and Hnilo (2006) discovered that, absent the leadership role that the experiments assumed in the original experiment (Zimbardo, 2007), prisoners were able to effectively resist the authority of the guards. They illustrate how the descent into tyranny is inevitable and how a sizable number of guards can resist through their own collective solidarity (see also Hnilo & Reicher, 2012). This study has not been without its critics (namely Zimbardo 2006) himself who noted problems with the simulation to replicate a prison system, among other critiques). But the important takeaway is that social identity theory provides us with a vocabulary to not just understand the perpetuation of injustice but also resistance against it. Hence, when a paradigm, it calls our attention to the analysis of resistance as a vital part of the social process toward justice and well-being.

Here my intent is not to suggest we ought to cease study and analysis of either perpetuation of injustice or its lived experience through its victims. Rather, echoing the calls of many of my colleagues, I want to suggest that our scope expand to center the analysis of resistance. It is doing, we recognize social structures and systems as always in a dynamic state of reproduction and permutation (Hammack et al., 2018, 2011a; Hammack & Toole, 2015). By joining sociologists in the systematic study of resistance, we offer a potentially vital contribution to the psychological factors and processes that are centralizing an unjust status quo.

Principle 5: Commitment to Public Science and Scientific Activism

W.E.B. Du Bois, Kurt Lewin, Marie Jahoda, Gordon Allport, Kenneth Clark, Charles Parks, Ernest Bevin, Herbert Kelman, Tom Pettigrew, Evelyn Hooker, Morton Deutsch, Phil Zimbardo, Craig Haney, Alida Hurtao, Ignacio Martinez-Baro, Michele Pinn, Heinz Winkler, Greg Heikk, Bal Meyer, Anne Piepl. What these individuals share, beyond a relation to social psychology (even if it was not their primary disciplinary "home"), is that each used their research to work for the public good. What we need to do is to start to see the research to work for the public good. What we need to do is to start to see the research to work for the public good.


discussion, we ought to consider how such an expertize might become less important to the public interest for justice and equality—so fully to be "use" to those who experience injustice (Fiske & Barrett, 2001). We must start with the primary question at hand: "What we need to do is to start to see the research to work for the public good. What we need to do is to start to see the research to work for the public good.

At every stage in our process of knowledge production and dissemination, we ought to consider how such expertize might become less important to the public interest for justice and equality—so fully to be "use" to those who experience injustice (Fiske & Barrett, 2001). We must start with the primary question at hand: "What we need to do is to start to see the research to work for the public good. What we need to do is to start to see the research to work for the public good.

The key point here is that we align our scientific practices with the communities whose interests for social justice we intend to serve, much as the communities of the Black Power movement of the 1960s did (see Toole & Fine, 2011; Toole et al., 2012). Our inspiration comes not just from
these contemporary examples of empirical work but also from our renewed collective memory of social justice. To this end, I offer a particular commitment to being a social scientist in the public interest. Beyond a commitment to serving the public, I recommend an embrace rather than a fear of constructing activist identities. Social activists as a concept often evolves forms of social practice beyond the academy—the picket line, the corporate boycott, the rally, the march. But science can be an insulating pursuit, for it uses the codifications of knowledge production to take us beyond ideology, toward the intractable facts of rationality derived evidence. Science only produces "alternative facts" when it has been contaminated by ideology, as was the case with the eugenics movement (Richards, 1997). The notion that science and politics are somehow disconnected—particularly social science—has been discredited (e.g., Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1986), so if we fail to name or intentionally silence our identities as aspiring change agents, even the most socially active scientific work can appear to be written in an unrecognizable style, we may unintentionally be in the process of naming. As the very least we can do is to name and to frame using our voices, to the possibility of genuine leadership in movements for social change. As the stories of so many of our colleagues reveal—Du Bois, Hooker, Harney, Clark, Finis, to name a few—it is not possible to hold the identities of scientist (or scholar, if one prefers) and activist simultaneously.

Interrogating Injustice A Roadmap My interest in charting these five principles is to provide a common vocabulary for the paradigm that has already emerged in psychological science—a paradigm with a long history but a renewed relevance. This paradigm is critical of the relationship between self and society, sensitive to power and its impact on personhood, mindful of the privilege of authority we hold as scholars, committed to the production of knowledge useful in the quest for social justice. Throughout this volume, we attempt to ground these themes in the kind of work that we might embody this type of paradigm. Here I briefly chart the major content areas of the volume, situating these contributions in perspective.

Historical, Theoretical, and Conceptual Foundations

Psychological scientists who seek to embody a commitment to social justice in their work must first have a comprehensive understanding of the concept of "social justice" and its use in related disciplines, refer to a set of principles, rather than any particular history. The first part of the volume seeks to achieve this end, through both this introductory chapter and Susan Opponent's (2018) chapter on social justice and methods. Exceptional reviews of social psychology and social justice theory and research exist elsewhere (e.g., Jan & Kay, 2010), and so our intent in this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the volume's focus to recapitulate those but rather to offer this set of principles as a generative guidepost for emerging scholars of social psychology and social justice. Opponent's (2018) contribution reviews the key ideas of social justice in social psychology, distinguishing among distributive, procedural, and retributive/restitutive justice. She then applies a social justice lens to issues of the environment. Issues of environmental justice in social psychology are relatively new but incredibly important as we consider the link among social justice, equity, health, and lived experience to an unjust status quo. We may unintentionally be in the process of naming. As the very least we can do is to name and to frame using our voices, to the possibility of genuine leadership in movements for social change. As the stories of so many of our colleagues reveal—Du Bois, Hooker, Harney, Clark, Finis, to name a few—it is not possible to hold the identities of scientist (or scholar, if one prefers) and activist simultaneously.

Critical Ontologies, Paradigms, and Methods As a principle of critical ontologies suggests, a social psychology of social justice benefits from paradigms and methods that highlight the relationships between social structures and lived experience. With this in mind, Paul (2012) offers the concept of critical biocritique to "rendezvous the relations between groups to structures of power, to social policies, to history, and to large sociopolitical formations" (p. 175). In practical terms, what they call a "bifocal design" documents the linkages and capillaries of structural arrangements and the discursive and lived-out practices by which privileged and marginalized youth and adults make sense of their circumstances (p. 176). The concept of critical biocritique is among the paradigmatic lenses we might call upon as we anchor the empirical work of documenting injustice and in its resistance. And of course there are others. Social identity theory has long offered a way of linking the microlevel (the individual's thoughts and feelings) and the macrolevel (individual's thoughts and feelings in groups outside the nation community, a process Opponent calls microcosm (originally suggested by Erwin Staub in a symposium, as noted in Opponent, 1990). This area of theory and research, which Opponent has led for decades (e.g., Opponent, 1959, 1993, 2007, 2012) is incredibly useful for social psychologists to understand the perpetuation and legitimation of injustice in many domains (e.g., Ploeg and Muro, Hambuck, & Clemmons, 2014). Opponent (2018) offers a new and unique review of models of social justice and their application (in this case, to the issue of environmental pollution). She also appropriately invokes three political philosophers—Martha Nussbaum, Wendy Brown, and Iris Marion Young—in offering insights into how social justice research can live up to its potential for social change. Nussbaum's capabilities framework, for example, highlights how the unjust distribution of capabilities affects human beings. However, social justice research may need to be oriented toward the empowerment of entire classes of people. Young provides guidance to would-be activists on how to influence deliberative processes—for example, through the use of public memory to construct ancient cultural narratives of entire classes of people. Opponent argues that social psychologists must engage with these other disciplines to provide a new lens of justice to gain insights into effective policy for social change.
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Nussbaum, Wendy Brown, and Iris Marion Young—to offer insights into how social justice research can live up to its potential for social change. Nussbaum's capabilities framework, for example, highlights how the unjust distribution of goods affects individuals in society. Drawing on a vast literature of ethical ideas of people, Young provides guidance to would-be activists on how to influence deliberative processes—for example, through the use of strategies such as public participation, cartations, marches, and the like. Oprotov argues that social psychologists must engage with these other disciplinary perspectives on justice to gain insights into effective activity for social change. The second section of the volume offers two contributions that speak to issues of paradigm and method in the social psychology of social justice. Langhout and Fernández (2018) draw our attention to a relatively understudied aspect incredibly relevant concept in our current times—that of citizenship. The idea of citizenship is key to social justice, for it provides the legal and moral basis for the treatment of individuals and groups. As a discipline, social psychology has tended to use language to connect individual social worlds as a fundamental feature of human development (see also Coch, 1982; McAdams, 1988), as well as a key mediator in the process of social status and change (see Wiersch, 1991). This is a key feature of citizenship, culture, and development has been extensively influential across several subdisciplines of psychology (see Hammack & Poleski, 2012; Hammack & Toelka, 2015).
In his contribution to this section of the volume, Frost (2018) argues for the vitality of what he calls "social justice," and the facilitation of progress. Following Ooi's (2006) treatise on critical personal ontology, Frost argues that decolonizing and communicating the meaning individuals make of "oppositional Ingenuity" provides compelling evidence that can be mobilized for social and political change. While hegemonic forms of psychological scholarship have privileged quantitative evidence and assumed that decision makers would be inherently compelled by numbers, the reality is that the human stories provided by narrative evidence can be quite persuasive to many in power. Frost (2018) highlights the way in which his own research program on a key social justice issue—the recognition of same-sex relationships—created evidence revealing the injustice of inequality for same-sex couples (e.g., Frost, 2011; Frost & Gola, 2013). Among other key findings, Frost discovered that the same-sex couple generated similar themes of intimacy compared to opposite-sex couples. However, narratives of same-sex couples revealed themes of stigma, prejudice, and discrimination, highlighting the way in which social injustice for same-sex couples (namely, the lack of cultural and legal recognition during the era of prohibition of same-sex marriage) created unique psychological stressors. As Henk (2018) notes in his later chapter in the volume, evidence of the psychological impact of inequality was key to the unique voice psychologists could assume in the legal fight for same-sex marriage.

A social psychology of social justice requires paradigms and methods that can work toward the goal of challenging opposition and inequality (Fine, 2006). These paradigmatic statements on cultural citizenry and narrative, respectively, offer just two of many possible lenses through which to frame social psychological research for social justice. The remaining chapters in the volume deal largely with domains of injustice.

Race, Ethnicity, Inequality

"...[The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line]," as the luminaries of European American social scientists and philosophers of the time W.E.B. Du Bois so aptly stated at the start of his landmark 1903 volume, The Souls of Black Folk (p. v). Indeed social psychology as a discipline came to the fore in the twentieth century and has been complicit in its effects to address this problem—more than an abstraction for social science, a lived reality for the many racial and ethnic minorities whose very being challenged the history of white supremacy in the United States. Prior to the Thirties and in the Forty’s, the exploitation of European colonialism throughout the century (Fonon, 1952/1967, 1951/ 2004), Du Bois’s (1909/1910) early analysis of the psychological legacy of slavery and the experience of racism was inspiring, poetic, and prescient. His notion of double consciousness ("this sense of always looking at oneself’s soul through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity"); Du Bois, (1903/196, p. 2) evokes this lived experience of "provincialism" existence as a person of color in a world defined by white supremacy.

The ideology of ethnic hierarchy that defined and legitimized oppressive social systems such as exclusionary nationalism, slavery, and colonialism reached its apex with World War II. The atrocities of the War created a new world order, not just politico-socially, but also economically for the technologic emergence of new institutions such as the United Nations) but also scientifically, as social science discipines consolidated their commitment (some more gradually than others) to a new ethic of cultural pluralism. Cultural anthropologists such as Franz Boas (1911), Ruth Benedict (1945), and Margaret Mead (1938) had already sought to use the tools of science to illustrate the benefits of diversity and promoting its benefits to society. As noted above, the founders of social psychology and their subsequent generations of students at the time took the role of pluralism and the replication of ethnic hierarchy for granted, so they charted the destinations of racism, authoritarianism, prejudice, and the like on perpetuators, victims, and society at large (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954; Clark, 1953; Lewin, 1948; Milgram, 1963).

While at times there were moments in which this larger narrative of scientific consensus against racism may have been questioned (most notably in problematic studies of intelligence differences among different racial groups; e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1990), a commitment to the critique of racism was made early in the first part of the 20th century and has characterized psychological science from the mid-twentieth century until today. It should, then, cause both alarm and a healthy dose of self-critique for our discipline as we must consider the role that racism across the globe, the resurgence of the kind of exclusionary nationalism (including in the United States that ignited all of the wars of the prior century, the erosion of faith in science to work for the good of all, and the development of legions designed to delegitimize the vital institutions of democracy—including science and media). Across the world and in our societies, there are many others who emerge as a consequence of this typological trend—artists, scientists, activities, and some brave political leaders. In this new context of explicit racism, this renewed effort to reclaim what has been lost to us through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.

The five chapters in this section of the volume speak to a new approach to the social psychology of race and racism in the twenty-first century, at its core, which links social psychology more directly to the field of critical legal studies and to a more complete understanding of the relationship among race, identity, and power. Christian Tilger has been a vital contributor to the social psychological study of race and racism in Europe, especially among the Roma—a racial group that has long been persecuted, across the continent (e.g., Tilgerk, 2005; 2006, 2007). He has especially highlighted the use of discourse and other cultural artifacts to delegitimize groups in multicultural Europe. Engaging closely with sociology and anthropology, Tilgerk (2018) proposes that our study of racism be characterized by critical analysis—an approach that views prejudice and racism as part of a larger cultural system intended to reify power asymmetries, rather than an individual psychological phenomenon. This position, as Tilgerk notes, has emerged strongly in social psychological literature outside of North America (e.g., Dixon, Levine, Reich, & Durheim, 2012). These and other social psychologists have increasingly challenged the notion that prejudice is simply a "low-rung problem" that can be addressed at the individual or interpersonal level (see also critiques of contract theory; e.g., Dixon, Durheim, & Tedoux, 2005). Tilgerk’s notion of critical analysis proposes that social psychologists move out of the lab and into the field, taking from other social science disciplines a rigorous approach to the study of culture and social structure.

Chapters by Srijaniquek Frost and colleagues (Fryer, Covarrubias, & Bunack, 2018) and William Cross (2018) return to the North American context to posit new forms of inquiry in the study of racial minorities. In the United States, in their very title, Fryberg and colleagues (2018) challenge the illusion that the colonization of indigenous peoples in North America is a phenomenon of the past. They illustrate the way in which colonialism endures through the designation of indigenous people’s cultures, identities, and practices in North America. They invoke the notion of a culture cycle that separates and assimilates indigenous and non-indigenous societies, arguing that historic and ongoing colonization of indigenous people interrupts an existing culture cycle, creating tremendous psychological risk for healthy development. Civilization endures in the social representations of indigenous people in the media (largely invisible), as well as the formal educational system constructed originally by the colonizers themselves. Modeling a particularly laudable form of social practice for social psychologists, Fryberg and colleagues do not simply theorize about the psychological impacts of colonization for North Americans. Rather, they propose a theory of culture change and illustrate one attempt to decolonize not just individual minds but cultural contexts themselves. Social justice for Native Americans cannot be achieved absent the legitimation of their cultures, which can occur through concrete changes in educational practice and policy, including the "un-masking" with traditional cultures. They offer an extended discussion of their attempt to decolonize the school context in the psychological interest of its indigenous students.

Cross’s (2018) critical review of research on Black identity and social justice challenges several narratives of the impact of slavery and racism on the psychological development and well-being of African Americans. His expansive treatment of historical, psychological, and other social scientific literatures reveals a "disruptive" social justice framework. He maps the potential contamination of oppressive social systems and the actual evidence of resilience and thriving among many Black people. I take Cross’s (2018) argument quite literally, as a "social psychology" that will yield here to the role psychologists sought to play in the legal battle for same-sex marriage; see Here, 2018; Kirtine & Wilkinson, 2004). In an argumentative threat that runs throughout these chapters, Cross suggests that social psychologists reconsider the narrowness of traditional experimental methods to approach issues of social justice.
In his contribution to this section of the volume, Frost (2018) argues for the vitality of what he calls the "psychology of race," and the recapitulation of prophecies. Following Outen’s (2008) treatment on critical personal psychology, Frost argues that documenting and communicating the meaning individuals make of "opportunistic insecurity" provides compelling evidence that can be mobilized for social and political change. While hegemonic forms of psychological scholarship have privileged quantitative evidence and assumed that decision makers would be inherently compelled by numbers, the reality is that the human stories provided by narrative evidence can be quite persuasive to many in power. Frost (2018) highlights the way in which his own research program on a key social justice issue—the recognition of same-sex relationships—created narrative evidence revealing the injustice of inequality for same-sex couples (e.g., Frost, 2011; Frost & Gola, 2013). Among other key findings, Frost discovered that same-sex couples were targeted for personal attack, even when their narratives were quite similar to opposite-sex couples. However, narratives of same-sex couples revealed themes of stigma, prejudice, and discrimination, highlighting the way in which social injustice for same-sex couples (namely, the lack of legal and cultural recognition during the era of prohibition of same-sex marriage) created unique psychological stress. As Henke (2018) notes in his later chapter in the volume, evidence of the psychological impact of inequality was key to the unique voice psychologists could assume in the legal fight for same-sex marriage.

A social psychology of social justice requires paradigms and methods that can work toward the goal of challenging oppression and inequality (Fine, 2006). These paradigmatic statements on cultural citizenship and narrative, respectively, offer just two of many possible lenses through which to frame social psychological research for social justice. The remaining chapters in the volume deal largely with domains of injustice.

Race, Ethnicity, Inequality

"...[The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line]," as the luminaries Ayer and Wynn (1979) social scientist and public intellectual, W.E.B. Du Bois, so aptly stated in the start of his landmark 1903 volume, The Souls of Black Folk (p. v). Indeed social psychology as a discipline came to prominence in the early twentieth century in its efforts to address this problem—more than an abstraction for social science, a lived reality for the many racial and ethnic minorities whose very being challenged the history of white supremacy in the United States. In their very title, Fyberg and colleagues (2018) challenge the illusion that the colonization of indigenous people's cultures, histories, and practices in North America. They invoke the notion of a culture cycle as a metaphor that provides us with a more nuanced understanding. As stated in the introduction to this thematic section—artists, scientists, activists, and some have political leaders. In this new context of explicit racism, this renewed effort to reclaim what we lost must be profound and redefine new forms of domination, we need a new social psychology of race and racism—one that takes us out of the overly cognitive realm of implicit bias (important as it is to course of inquiry of, or, back into the fray of explicit racism, which had never really faded to the extent many social scientists had proposed anyway (Leach, 2015).

The five chapters in this section of the volume speak to a new approach to the social psychology of race and racism in the twenty-first century—at least which links social psychology more directly to the field of critical legal studies and to a more complete understanding of the relationship among race, identity, and power. Cristian Tiliegă has been a vital contributor to the social psychological study of race and racism in Europe, especially among the Roma—an ethnic group that has long been persecuted, across the continent (e.g., Tiliegă, 2005, 2006, 2007). He has especially highlighted the use of discourse and other cultural artifacts to delegitimize groups in multilevel culture. Engaging closely with sociology and anthropology, Tiliegă (2018) proposes that our study of race behavior can be characterized by critical analysis—an approach that views prejudice and racism as part of a larger cultural system intended to rely upon asymmetries, rather than an individual psychological phenomenon. This position, as Tiliegă notes, has emerged strongly in social psychological literature outside of North America (e.g., Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durham, 2012). These and other social psychologists have increasingly challenged the notion that prejudice is simply a "structural problem that can be addressed at the individual or interpersonal level (see also critiques of construct theory, e.g., Dixon, Durham, & Tedoux, 2005). Tiliegă's notion of critical analysis proposes that the relationship between social psychologists move out of the lab and into the field, taking from other social science disciplines a rigorous approach to the study of culture and social structure. Chapsras by Sophie Fyberg and colleagues (Fyberg, Cowen’s, and Burack, 2018) and William Cross (2018) return to the North American context to posit new forms of inquiry in the study of racial minorities in the United States. This is a time for scholars and activists alike to think critically about the forces that drive and sustain prejudice and racism, and to imagine new forms of action that can move us forward.
interrogative phenomena such as racial preferences in the

A key sense of a more critical approach to race, ethnicity, and culture is that the terms we use to describe difference across human communities are themselves subject to analysis (see Gajdusek, 1964). In her work, our science becomes more "complete" when we ask not just about psychological experience in particular cultural settings or of individuals embodying particular identities but rather about the meaning of cultures and identities themselves (see Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Cross-cultural changes, for example, problematize the tendency to expect that race itself is a marker of psychological distance. Okazaki's (2018) chapter on culture and social justice across Asians and Asian Americans offers a critical perspective on the use of the culture concept itself among psychologists to produce essentializing notions of culture and ethnicity (see also Gjerde, 2014).

As Okazaki (2018) argues, psychological approaches to the study of Asian and Asian American cultures offer a critical perspective on the essentialization of mainstream cultural psychology (e.g., Blatt, 2007a, 2007b; Gjerde, 2004; Hamanaka, 2008) and calls for a new paradigm for cultural psychology that can better serve the interests of social justice for Asians and Asian Americans. She proposes that we diversify our concepts of culture in psychology through transdisciplinary dialogue, expand our methods (especially through the use of narrative methods; see Hamanaka, 2010b), and diversify the knowledge production process itself by recognizing the implicit bias toward Europe and North America in journals. Okazaki's (2018) argument is thus comprehensive in its critical interrogation not only of the way in which Asians and Asian Americans have been represented in psychological science, but also of the reifying potential of an uncritical approach to social categorization (including concepts of race, ethnicity, and culture; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) and the emergence of Euro-American scholars and epistemologies. The final chapter in this section of the volume continues to interrogate simplistic notions of race and gender, both in scholarship and in public and popular discourses. It offers an intervention in the perspective in social psychology. One of the earlier treaties on what we

now call intersectionality was penned by social psychology contributaries who have been working on the role of social identity theories and research on social identity in advancing social psychology (e.g., Wetherell, 1997; Clark & Potter, 2001). However, scholars working in this field have been criticized for not fully addressing the multiplicity of social identities individuals may hold at any given point in time. Hurtado (2018) calls these "multi-stations" of sexuality, class, ethnicity, and physical ability. Hurtado's account of how psychology is a key way through which dominant social processes and intergroup interactions shape identities and experiences (see, for example, the work of Nelkin, 1994; Hollonwell, 1914; Wetherell, 2001; see also Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986). Over the course of its disciplinary history, psychology gradually came to be generally understood as a science, erasing any view of psychology as an interpretative science and passing over the way in which experiences of women and development may be psychologically distinct (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Wetherell, 1986) and the way in which structural disadvantage impinges upon women's identity and development (see, for example, Eagon, Row, Riger, & McHugh, 2012).

In her pathbreaking book, The Lessons of Gender, Sandra Lipsett Ben (1993) reveals the way in which the scientific study of gender contributed to the subordination of women by legitimizing sex differences as "natural" and socializing the view of the nature of gender, sex, and women. Ben's work left a lasting impression on the way in which the study of gender was to be conducted in the years that followed. Ben's work was groundbreaking in that it brought to light the ways in which the scientific study of gender, sex, and women contributed to the subordination of women by legitimizing sex differences as "natural" and socializing the view of the nature of gender, sex, and women. Ben's work left a lasting impression on the way in which the study of gender was to be conducted in the years that followed.
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A key sense of a more critical approach to race, ethnicity, and culture is that the terms we use to describe difference across human communities are themselves subject to analysis. Ginzburg (2004) in her book, *Our science becomes more "complete" when we ask not just about psychological experience in particular cultural settings or of individuals embodying particular identities, but rather about the meaning of *cultures and identities* themselves (see Reich et al., 2001). Cross cultural, for example, problems the tendency to expect that race itself is a marker of psychological distance. Olzak's (2018) chapter on culture and social justice among Asians and Asian Americans offers a critical perspective on the use of the culture concept itself among psychologists to produce essentializing notions of culture and ethnicity (see also Gjøde, 2014).

As Olzak (2018) argues, psychological approaches to the study of Asian and Asian Americans whose orientation to the experience of diversity of cultural groups. While the emergence of cultural psychology has been tremendously important for psychological science to recognize its historical narrowness (e.g., Arnott, 2008; Marins & Kizayama, 1991; Shwedik, 1996; Shwedik & Sullivan, 1993). Olzak's contribution to this critical redefinition of mainstream cultural psychology (e.g., Bhatia, 2007a, 2007b; Gjøde, 2004; Hammac, 2008) and calls for a new paradigm for cultural psychology that can better serve the interest of social justice for Asians and Asian Americans. She proposes that we diversify our concepts of culture in psychology through transcultural dialogue, expand our methods (especially through the use of narrative methods; see Hammac, 2010a), and diversify the knowledge production process itself by recognizing the implicit bias toward Europe and North America in journals. Olzak's (2018) argument is thus comprehensive in its critical interrogation not only of the way in which Asians and Asian Americans have been represented in psychological science, but also of the reifying potential of an uncritical approach to social categorization (including concepts of race, ethnicity, and culture). Reich et al., 2001) and the emerging memory of Euro-American scholars and epistemologists.

The final chapter in this section of the volume continues to interrogate simplistic notions of race and gender, providing a primer on and against 2004: 35). It presents an intercultural perspective in social psychology. One of the earliest treatises on what we now call intersectionality was penned by social psychologist used for it to speak to the multiplicity of social identities individuals may hold at any given point in time. Hurtado (2018) calls these "master narratives" of sexuality, class, ethnicity, and physical inability to structural explanations for sex differences (e.g., Hollingworth, 1914; Woolley, 1930; see Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986). Over the course of its discipline history, psychology gradually came to understand the centrality of structural processes and institutional intersectionality (Reichert, 2004). Hence both paradigms are worthy of consolidation as they both foreground notions of power. Bennett's theory article by Anandh (2018), expands upon Du Bois's (1903/1995) notion of double consciousness. Anandh (1887) invokes the physical concept of the border between Mexico and the United States to characterize the psychological experience of Chicanas growing up on the border, their mental consciousness providing them with a sense of objectivity duality that combines and unites, allowing her to "escape" (p. 162).

Hurtado's (2018) unique linkage of these theoretical perspectives opens up new ways of thinking about lived experiences of intersectionality and inequality. As she notes in her conclusion, intersectionality does not privilege one social identity over another. In an ever-diversifying US cultural landscape, in which identity pluralism has become a norm, intersectionality reveals that holding multiple group identities is possible but that particular configurations of intersectional identities can have different implications for the experience of inequality. But with this experience comes opportunities for political coalition building, opportunities for individuals who inhabit particular configurations of social categorization to use identity to work for social change (see Hammac, 2010a). Hurtado (2018) thus invisibly implicates the contemporary concern with intersectionality in longstanding theoretical considerations in social psychology and social justice (e.g., Tafel, 1981).

Gender, Sexuality, Inequality

The subordination of women represents perhaps the most compelling evidence of systemic injustice over the course of human history. Patriarchy—the social system and accompanying ideology that privileges males authority and social power (e.g., Weatherford, 2000) continues to characterize most sociocultural and political contexts, codifying inequality in culture, custom, and law (Richardson, 2011). Early psychological science, rooted in a cognizant paradigm of intelligence, contributed to hierarchical thinking, and the neglect and legitimated gender-based inequality (Bem, 1993; Eagly, 1995; Shields, 2007), largely ignoring research conducted by women that suggested strong gender differences (e.g., Hollingworth, 1914; Woolley, 1930; see Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986). Over the course of its discipline history, psychology gradually came to understand the centrality of structural processes and institutional intersectionality (Reichert, 2004). Hence both paradigms are worthy of consolidation as they both foreground notions of power. Bennett's theory article by Anandh (2018), expands upon Du Bois's (1903/1995) notion of double consciousness. Anandh (1887) invokes the physical concept of the border between Mexico and the United States to characterize the psychological experience of Chicanas growing up on the border, their mental consciousness providing them with a sense of objectivity duality that keeps her a prisoner (p. 162).

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in which problems in women's health and development can be traced to objectification. Following Firel (1988) call to study adolescent femininity, sexual and "cultural" desire directly, Tolman and Stabler (1959) revealed the way in which the sexual location of adolescent girls impacted how they talked about desire (see also Tolman, 2002). They found that urban girls described sexual agency "in the service of protection" (from AIDS, pregnancy, and reputation), while suburban girls described sexual agency "in the service of pleasure" (a more internal conflict about the management of desire). Glick and Fiske (2001) complicated perspectives on sexism by distinguishing between hostile and benevolent sexism, which represent complementary justifications for gender inequality.

In the end of the twentieth century, psychology had thus come to reconcile its own sexist and patriarchal past to provide paradigms through which to understand woman's lives in the context of continuities and discontinuities. The critical perspective on sex and gender included an underlying theory of subjectivity (consistent with the principle of critical methodology) as oriented in power, complicated by the heteronormative asymmetry between men and women and the use of a biessentialist discourse in psychology itself that contributed to sex inequality (Kurtz, 1993). The social psychology of sex and gender was more characterized by a normative stance toward gender equality (i.e., the subordination of women is unacceptable) partially as a problematic cultural ideology and an explicit alliance with the subordinate through the production of knowledge intended to benefit women's lives (e.g., Tolman, 2002).

Two of the three chapters in this section of the volume expand upon these perspectives on gender and social justice. Abigail Stewart has been a key institutional architect of feminist psychology (Grabe, 2002) and use of empirical methods to study women's lives in context (e.g., Stewart, 1980; 1994; Stewart, Cirestia, & Carrin, 2008; Stewart & Glower, 1958; Stewart & Winter, 1974, 1977). Her work not only assumes a critical ontological perspective and a normative stance toward social justice, it has also examined an analysis of resistance through the study of women's lives on a global scale (e.g., Stewart and Zuckerkandl, 2011). Stewart and Zuckerkandl's (2018) chapter takes as its point of departure the notion that psychological well-being is directly connected to one's location in the social structure, fully embodying the principles of cultural practices, policies, laws, and cultural practices that place women in a subordinate position are detrimental to women's psychological well-being and development—an unacceptable out- come and a barrier to justice and equality. Anchored in canonical perspectives in feminist psychology, Stewart and Zuckerkandl (2018) illustrate the way in which social structures may disable their physical and psychological well-being, focusing on experiences with discrimination, workplace harassment, and sexual and self-objectification. While Stewart and Zuckerkandl (2018) define sexism as a structural and individual phenomenon that creates and legitimates social and psychological injustice, the chapter is a call to resist sexism as it perpetuates and endorses sexist ideologies. It shows how to resist sexism and anti-gay violence against gay and lesbian sexualities could be linked to the cultural ideology of privileged heterosexuality and denigrated other forms of intimacy. Meyer's (2003) minority stress theory provides the larger conceptual framework through which we have come to understand the link between prejudice and health for sexual minorities. He argues that a cultural context of heterosexism creates structural disadvantage for sexual minorities (e.g., lack of workplace discrimination), but also, for people who are excluded by the cultural ideology of marriage (e.g., same-sex couples) or being hetero (e.g., gender identity and sexual orientation), such processes mediate the link between prejudice and health and mental health outcomes, and factors such as sexual minority community involvement and a positive sexual identity moderate these associations (e.g., Brown, Harper, & Bemeizer, 2013; Wong, Scharig, Holloway, Meyer, & Kipke, 2014). Minority stress theory has become the dominant paradigm through which several disciplines, including psychology and public health, view the experiences of sexual minorities. As already noted, both Heerik and Meyer focused on the legal case that overturned California's ban on same-sex marriage, and their testimony along with other scholars was cited as key in the court's decision (Hammack & Windall, 2011; Heerik, 2018). Similar to the work of Stewart and Zuckerkandl (2018), the link these scholars make is between social structure and psychological well-being providing a compelling scientific basis from which to argue for social justice through structural change.
in which problems in women's health and development can be traced to objectification. Following Firel (1990) call to study adolescent female sexual desire directly, Tolman and Stuebner (1999) revealed the way in which the sexual location of adolescents impacted how they talked about desire (see also Tolman, 2002). They found that urban girls described sexual agency "in the service of protection" (from AIDS, pregnancy, and reputation), while suburban girls described sexual agency "in the service of pleasure" (a more internal conflict about the management of desire). Glick and Fiske (2001) complicated perspectives on sexism by distinguishing between hostile and benevolent sexism, which represent complementary justifications for gender inequality.

In the end of the twentieth century, psychology had thus come to reconcile its own sects and patriarchal past to provide paradigms through which to understand women's lives in the context of continuous sexual inequality and inequity. This chapter's prescriptive perspective on sex and gender included an underlying theory of subjectivity (consistent with the principle of critical ontology) as outlined in power, committed by the binocular asymmetry between men and women and the use of a bi-essentialist discourse in psychology itself that contributed to sex inequality (Tolman, 1995). The social psychology of sex and gender was now characterized by a normative stance toward gender equality (i.e., the subordination of women is unacceptable; patriarchy is a problematic cultural ideology) and an explicit alliance with the subordinate through the production of knowledge intended to benefit women's lives (e.g., Tolman, 2002).

Two of the three chapters in this section of the volume expand upon these perspectives on gender and social justice. Abigail Stewart has been a key institutional architect of feminist psychology; Graebe (2018) finds that use of empirical methods to study women's lives in context (e.g., Stewart, 1980; 1994; Stewart, Cicero, & Carini, 2008; Stewart & Garro, 1998; Stewart & Wisner, 1974, 1977). Her work not only assesses a critical ontological perspective and a normative stance toward social justice, it has also examined an analysis of resistance through the study of women's lives on a global scale (e.g., Stewart & Wisner, 1974). Stewart and Wisner (1974) reflect on the challenge that social psychologists engaged in this work must practice reflectivity by being fully aware of the power imbalances that exist between scholars and research subjects and that successful scholarship and partnerships require recognition of power asymmetries and a commitment to the production of knowledge that will serve the interests of the subjects. Taken together, Stewart and Zuckerman (2018) and Graebe's (2018) contributions provide a new generation of social psychologists with a critical perspective through which to investigate gender inequality. Both contributions emphasize several of the critical principles I have proposed in this chapter, committed to a critical perspective on selves and societies, a normative stance toward justice, an explicit commitment with the subordination of women is unacceptable; patriarchy is a problematic cultural ideology and an explicit alliance with the subordinate through the production of knowledge intended to benefit women's lives (e.g., Tolman, 2002).

In a similar vein to Stewart and Zucker (2018), Graebe (2018) frames contemporary social justice issues for women through the lens of human rights. She connects women's psychological well-being to issues of political and economic justice by linking social psychological and transnational feminist perspectives. (2018) deploys a transnational feminist psychology in the study of women's social justice in global perspective, anchored in the experience of grassroots activists working for gender equality and thus foregrounding an analysis of resistance. This analysis follows her empirical work revealing the link between land ownership and enhanced social and psychological well-being among women in numerous cultural contexts (e.g., Graebe, 2011; 2012; Graebe, Dunn, & Duvikin, 2014; Graebe, Guo, & Dunn, 2015).

Graebe (2018) argues that a transnational feminist liberation psychology offers an ideal paradigm through which to study social justice issues for women on a global scale. A key goal of this paradigm is to document existing grassroots efforts intended to work for women's human rights, using methods that privilege marginalized women's perspectives (e.g., narrative methods; see Graebe, 2017). Importantly, Graebe suggests that social psychologists engaged in this work must practice reflectivity by being fully aware of the power imbalances that exist between scholars and research subjects, and that successful scholarship and partnerships require recognition of power asymmetries and a commitment to the production of knowledge that will serve the interests of the subjects. Taken together, Stewart and Zuckerman (2018) and Graebe's (2018) contributions provide a new generation of social psychologists with a critical perspective through which to investigate gender inequality. Both contributions emphasize several of the critical principles I have proposed in this chapter, committed to a critical perspective on
homophobia, it does begin to challenge the premise of minority stress theory. If same-sex intimacy becomes in the range of "normal," then the behavior, as Hoekert (1957) so long ago argued, what are the implications for the social and psychological lives of sexual minorities?

Langridge (2018) offers a compelling, critical account of where this process of "normalization" of same-sex desire and sexual minority identity may lead. He challenges conventional scholarship in psychology on sexual minorities, pointing to a "benign" or "seemingly tenuous" that favors the assimilative wing of the queer movement (see Stein, 2012). For those outside the larger queer community, this perspective may not only be very new; it may also be perplexing and disruptive. The important point to consider is that the movement for sexual liberation has long been split between those who favor inclusion in the existing social structure through access to institutions like marriage, and those who favor the adoption of a queer culture and identity as a form of critique of normativity in all its forms (see Wanner, 1999). One of Langridge's (2018) important points is that psychological research on sexual minorities has favored the assimilative branch of the movement in part by neglecting documentation and analysis of what we might call the resistance branch of the movement. In other words, the dominant emphasis on documenting the "equivalency" of same-sex and opposite-sex relationships and the effects of exclusion from heteronormative institutions has neglected the study of the full range of sexual diversity and the psychological benefits of queerness (see Blomgren & Wilkinson, 2019). Langridge (2018) argues that the grounding of the LGTBQ social movement in a liberal model of social justice that emphasizes individual rights and responsibilities comes at a cost: "... the loss of an aggressive, politically engaged—perhaps better still, politically energized—queer subject who seeks to effect radical social change rather than assimilate to the hegemonic demands of individual 'responsible' citizenship." In this audacious but compelling narrative, Langridge (2018) challenges the conventional wisdom on the perceived successes of the LGTBQ social movement.

The section in the volume reveals on the one hand the strides made in social psychology toward developing new paradigms to understand and advocate for social justice on the basis of gender and sexual identity. Both Streett and Zendegui (2017) and Grabo (2018) highlight the link between social structure and psychological well-being, and they make their paradigms that I suspect will be highly generative for new research in the area of gender equality and social justice. It is now abundantly clear that structural violence has a mental health toll.

The second way in which this volume is most critical is what I call the "normalization" or "equality" paradigm: the view that we must challenge these assumptions to rethink the structure of gender identity in society. This view is at the heart of the current empirical work to assess how lived experiences shift with changes in law, policy, and cultural discourse. This is a critical step in the process of understanding the psychological impact of gender identity in society. It is also important to recognize that the psychological impact of gender identity is not unique to the social and psychological lives of sexual minorities.

My own position as a member of the sexual minority community and a scholar whose work actually contributes to understanding the psychological impact of gender identity in society is informed by the injustice of structural disadvantage and stigma and the injustice of a compulsory form of identity within the queer community. Langridge's (2018) challenge can be interpreted not necessarily as a repudiation of prior frameworks but as a call for a more complete analysis of the psychological experience: one that fully acknowledges resistance to notions of normativity. In my own work poverty and wealth are also seen as a way to document the injustice of stigma as well as the creative responses achieved through diverse conceptions of identity and identity.

To return to the radical potential of social identity theory (e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), I would argue that the struggle of gender, sexuality, and social justice benefits from a critical analysis of the social categories themselves. Anyone who engages with young people today and considers the dynamics of living in a world where they are navigating labels related to gender and sexuality can attest to the construction of existing social categories (e.g., Adams et al., 2014; Hammack & Cohier, 2009; Savin-Williams, 2005). I refuse to suggest that identities such as man, woman, gay, lesbian, and the like are irrelevant to today's youth, for empirical evidence reveals that such labels continue to have meaning and significance for contemporary youth (e.g., Hammack et al., 2009; Russell, Clark, & Clary, 2009).

At the very minimum, social categories related to gender and sexuality are a process of expression, reflection, and identity that is shaped through social interaction and socialization. The core elements of this process are the interaction between the social categories and the individuals who adopt them. The psychological processes that underlie these interactions are complex and multifaceted, and they are not limited to the social context.

Social class is a defining concept across the social sciences, in fields like politics, economics, and sociology. For example, legitimizes class division by recognizing that the psychological treatment of social class, even within social psychology, is relatively thin compared with other markers of social identity such as race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual identity (Crittore & Cole, 2015). Social class is a critical concept because it has often been associated with the dominant US narrative of meritocracy and the "American Dream" to obscure the significance of social class and economic position in individual development and well-being (Bullock, 2013).

Social psychology has gradually moved to identify classism as a form of the psychological inclusions of the poor (2002) argues that classism functions not just through stereotypes and prejudice against the poor but also through cognitive and behavioral processes in which income individuals are morally excluded from the larger community. Classism endures because it is deeply anchored in cultural beliefs that attribute poverty to individual, rather than structural, explanations (e.g., individual laziness rather than lack of opportunity; see Bullock, 1999). These beliefs are codified in dominant social narratives. Thus, the master narrative of the "American Dream" in which rapid social mobility across generations is credited to the social and economic system of the United States (Bullock, 2013; Bullock & Loot, 2010). The strong belief in meritocracy—that individual success can be largely attributed to merit, rather than being constrained by limited opportunities based on factors such as race, gender, and class—is also a core tenet of this master narrative (Bullock, 2013). The proliferation of these often unquestioned discourses in US culture provides legitimacy for the distancing processes of moral exclusion (Lott 2002).<ref>Wartman & Bullock, 2005</ref>

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The proliferation of these often unexamined discourses in US culture provides legitimacy for the 
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Discourses and narratives do not simply pro-
liferate in societies, though. They are constructed 
and sustained by political activists and political 
leaders. In their contribution to this section of the 
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analysis assumes an explicitly critical ontological perspective, identifying discourse about wealth and power is an essential determinant of economic discourse. They reveal the way in which the "rackets" discourse (i.e., individuals who draw more in aid and services than they contribute) is rooted in dominant US ideology of individualism, meritocracy, and rapid social mobility (i.e., "the American Dream"). Bullock and Reppond (2018) argue for the dismantling of this ideology by using empirical evidence to expose economic injustice. Such research ideally would lead to social policy change that recognizes the structural basis of poverty and the way in which opportunities and institutions might work for economic equality. While Bullock and Reppond (2018) emphasize discourse, power, and social psychological processes such as stereotyping in the perpetuation of classism. Walker and Smith (2018) take a relational perspective on classism. They reveal the way in which class inequalities are reproduced through processes of social exclusion. Walker and Smith (2018) propose that everyday human relationships serve as sites of social class construction. Drawing upon social theorist Pierre Bourdieu, they argue for a relational view of power: "Class hierarchies are created through a system of social relationships, in which we all play a part. Power is thus found in the domination of others—in the ability to have success at the expense of someone else's failures."

Taken together, the chapters in this section of the volume highlight the way in which inequitable social positions are maintained through both language and social interaction, harnessing both critical and critical social theories that emphasize the social construction of power and identity (e.g., Marx, 1859/1973). Central to Marx's social theory was the notion that individual subjectivity is a product of the material basis of society. The economic structure of society determines the nature of social relations and individual psychology. Later social theorists such as George Herbert Mead (1934) would propose a more dynamic model of self-society constitution (i.e., symbolic interactions: see also Blumer, 1969). No one perceives the world as he or she feels it, as social interactions are a network in which individuals act in the capacity of language as a central mediator of the social process. Voloshinov, Vygotsky, and Bakhtin—architects of cultural-historical activity theory—showed that Marx's ideas were relevant to a more dynamically view of those as the US symbolic interactionists, arguing strongly for the ideologival basis of language (see especially Voloshinov, 1929/1973). Foucault would later provide more explicit evidence of the way in which language and power are co-constituted in our understanding of social reality and social categories (e.g., Foucault, 1965, 1972, 1977, 1978). My point here is that the underlying argument of both Bullock and Reppond (2018) and Walker and Smith (2018) is part of a longer tradition of social theory that highlights the way in which social relations are produced and reproduced through language and social interaction. This critical ontological perspective views individual agency as always constrained by both structural forces such as discourse and social policy that maintain inequality and possibilities for social interaction. The contributors in this section of the volume have slightly different notions of the path toward economic justice, but both see the importance of analyzing the reproduction of hegemonic Western norms and values (Marsella, 2012). Economic inequality may become more pronounced, as the global capitalist marketplaces hold in societies without adequate safeguards to manage disruptions to local economies (Marsella, 2012). Some specific justice implications of globalization are significant and worthy of study among social psychologists. Our unique contribution lies in the ability to theorize and empirically document the link among social structure, individual subjectivity, and well-being. Embracing a critical ontological perspective, we have the potential to illuminate the way in which the cultural and economic challenges that globalization brings impact individual lives and social relations.

Psychological perspectives on globalization have tended to emphasize issues of identity and conflict. For example, Arnett (2002) argues that globalization creates a new context for identity development, with many individuals developing bicultural identities (i.e., identities constructed in reference to both local and global cultures), shifts in the life course, with delays in the assumption of adult roles compared with prior generations and the increasingly universal period of "emerging" adulthood. Notably, even this brief overview of the ways we have seen in the literature of thinking about the intersection of identity and social class. Biological, psychological, and cultural theories have often emphasized a deconstructivist model of human agency. In this context, several studies from Liu and Pratto (2018) appropriately anchor their analysis of links between global capitalism, power, and colonialism. They offer the case of Zambia as a model to understand how critical justice-related power, social relations, and self-understanding. Their contribution embodies a critical ontological perspective in which individuals and groups are understood through the lens of history and social structure. Migration and belonging are key concepts in the global order. Discourses and policies of exclusion (best exemplified in the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the United States and Europe) compete with those intended to promote cultural pluralism and the benefits of globalization. Bhata (2018) highlights the way in which a critical historical orientation—"9/11"—has contributed to debates over issues concerning the migration of South Asians to the United States. He highlights the strategies South Asian immigrants have used to navigate racialized discourses of citizenship and minority status. In this contribution, we see an alliance with the subaltern and an analysis of resistance that speak to the social psychology of social justice promoted throughout this book. Bhata (2018) recognizes the diverse ways in which individuals negotiate marginality, distinguishing between "empowering and distancing" marginality, and he situates this analysis as part of the broader movement in social psychology to center a dynamic view of the social context. As a leader in the movement to understand how transnationalism and globalization impact individual lives (e.g., Bhata, 2007a, 2007b), Bhata is well positioned to call our attention to social justice in global perspective.

With its history of colonial expansion and its porous social and economic policies that have opened borders, Europe has been a central site for our understanding of multiculturalism. European social psychology has also historically been more sensitive to issues of societal and collective influence on individual cognition and behavior (e.g., Moscovici, 1988; Tajfel, 1972, 1981). European social psychologists have long been among the first to identify the importance of the intersection of cultural identity and class membership. Chryssochoou (2018) suggests that societal organization that highlights cultural group membership, over class may have family histories tension across ethno-cultural or religious identities, as these identities become the sole basis upon which migrants may organise to seek justice. In this chapter, Chryssochoou examines a theoretical framework based on culture rather than class might exacerbate conflict by framing difference in cultural (and
analysis assumes an explicitly critical ontological perspective, identifying discourse about wealth and power as expressing and perpetuating economic dynamics. They reveal the way in which the "takers" discourse (i.e., individuals who draw more in aid and services than they contribute) is rooted in dominant US ideological presuppositions about individualism, meritocracy, and rapid social mobility (i.e., the "American Dream"). Bullock and Reppond (2018) argue for the dismantling of this ideology and the replacement of the mythology that functions to maintain and sustain the wealth and maintains inequalities. Social psychological research can play a role in challenging this ideology by using empirical evidence to expose economic injustice. Such research ideally would lead to social policy change that recognizes the structural basis of poverty and the way in which opportunities and institutions might work for economic equality.

While Bullock and Reppond (2018) emphasize discourse, power, and social psychological processes such as stereotyping in the perpetuation of classism, Walker and Smith (2018) take a relational perspective on classism. They reveal the way in which class inequities are reproduced through processes of social exclusion. Walker and Smith (2018) propose that everyday human relationships serve as sites of social class construction. Drawing upon social theorist Pierre Bourdieu, they argue for a relational view of power: "Class hierarchies are created through a system of social relationships, in which we all play a part. Power is thus found in the domination of others—in the ability of each to have success at the expense of others' failure".

Taken together, the chapters in this section of the volume highlight the way in which inequitable social positions are maintained through both language and social interaction, heralding back to critical social theories that emphasize the social construction of power and identity (e.g., Marx, 1859/1973). Central to Marx's social theory was the notion that individual subjectivity is a product of the material basis of society. The economic structure of society determines the nature of social relations and individual psychology. Later social theorists such as George Herbert Mead (1934) would propose a more dynamic model of self-social constitution (i.e., symbolic interactions); see also Bronski, 2001). Mead, along with other sociologists, ascribed primary language to a central metaphor of the social process. Volokhov, Vytrusky, and Bakhtin—architects of cultural-historical activity theory, along with Activity theorists Marx's ideas were translated into a more dynamic view as those of the US symbolic interactionists, arguing strongly for the ideological basis of language (see especially Volokhov, 1929/1973). Foucault would later provide more evidence that those who are powerful in our understanding of social reality and social categories (e.g., Foucault, 1965, 1972, 1977, 1978). My point here is that the underlying argument of both Bullock and Reppond (2018) and Walker and Smith (2018) is part of a long tradition of social theory that highlights the way in which social relations are produced and reproduced through language and social interaction. This critical ontological perspective views individual agency as always constrained by both structural forces such as discourse and social policy that maintain inequality and possibilities for social interaction. The contributors in this section of the volume have slightly different notions of the path toward economic justice, but both sets of contributors are united in their view that greater awareness of classism, class privilege, and the structural root of poverty is needed as an essential step toward equality.

Globalization, Conflict, Inequality

The technological and cultural advances of the twentieth century ushered in a new era of human history—one in which trade, migration, and opportunities for mutual cultural influence expanded exponentially (Arnett, 2003; Larson, 2002). In this new heightened era of globalization, tensions have arisen which have largely been considered at the economic and political levels (Phillips, 2012). For example, the 2004 Human Development Report of the UNDP emphasized the way in which globalization can create heightened political conflict as local economies and cultural values are threatened by exposure to global culture and markets. Psychological perspectives on globalization have tended to emphasize issues of identity and conflict. For example, Arnett (2002) argues that globalization creates a new context for identity development, with many individuals developing bicultural identities (i.e., identities constructed in reference to both local and global cultures). Shifts in the life course, with delays in the assumption of adult roles compared with prior generations and the increasingly universal period of "emerging" adulthood, also impact emerging considerations of power and social identity in the psychological study of social justice. Psychological theories have often overemphasized a decentered model of human agency. In this context, research in sociocultural psychology (Li and Pratto, 2018) appropriately anchor their analysis of the global context of history, power, and colonialism. They offer the case of Nazi Germany as a model to understand how critical junctures in the development of identity and social roles anchor their analysis of the global context of history, power, and colonialism. They offer the case of Nazi Germany as a model to understand how critical junctures can impact identity and social roles. The contribution of this critical ontological perspective in which individuals and groups are understood through the lens of history and social structure.

Migration and belonging are key concepts in the global order. Discourses and politics of exclusion (best exemplified in the resurgence of ethno-nationalism in the United States and Europe) compete with those intended to promote cultural pluralism and the benefits of globalization. Bhata (2018) highlights the way in which a critical historical perspective—"from 1971—has been used to address issues concerning the migration of South Asians to the United States. He highlights the strategies South Asian immigrants have used to navigate racialized discourses of citizenship and minority status. In this contribution, we see an alliance with the subordinate and an analysis of resistance that speak to the social psychological study of social justice promoted throughout this book. Bhata (2018) recognizes the diverse ways in which individuals negotiate marginality, distinguishing between "empowering and disempowering" marginality, and he situates his analysis in the broader movement in social psychology to center a dynamic view of the social context. As a leader in the movement to understand how transnationalism and globalization impact individual lives (e.g., Bhata, 2007a, 2007b), Bhata is well positioned to call our attention to social justice in global perspective.

With its history of colonial expansion and its porous social and economic policies that have opened borders, Europe has been a central site for our understanding of multiculturalism. European social psychology has also historically been more sensitive to issues of societal and collective influence on individual cognition and behavior (e.g., Moscovici, 1988; Tajfel, 1972, 1982; see Meghadithi, 1987). Chryssochou's (2018) analysis of Europe raises a central issue in understanding social justice in the context of multiculturalism. Anchored precisely in the European social psychological tradition, she highlights the way in which distinct social representations of societal organization have implications for social identity development, and the intersection of cultural identity and class membership. Chryssochou's (2018) suggests that societal organization that highlights cultural group membership, over class may serve especially heightened tensions across ethnic-cultural or religious identities, as these identities become the sole basis upon which migrants may organise to seek justice. In this contribution, the discussion is based on culture rather than class might exacerbate conflict by framing difference in cultural (and...
possibly then (irrationality) rather than economic terms. Ethnically different perspectives in the volume (e.g., Bullock & Repojnd, 2018; Durrheim & Doretti, 2018) analysis reveals the way in which the discourses about social categories themselves has vital empirical importance. Social justice and can influence how privileged citizens view subordinate groups. Here we see not only a critical ontological perspective but also an alliance with the subordinate that can eradicate the social injustices of particular social representations.

Globalization is by no means a neutral cultural or economic process, and theoretical perspectives that can accommodate the relative positions of groups and social actors are vital to the social psychological study of global social justice in the twenty-first century. Warren and Moghadam's (2018) chapter on positioning theory and social justice offers quite such a perspective, with its overview of the theory and its application to two national settings of heightened conflictuality since Allport's (1954) original formulation makes several assumptions rooted in the critical principles outlined in this chapter. Most notably, the theory's assumptions about the relationships among social structures (or "normative" systems), language, and social reality can be linked to a critical ontological perspective on persons and contexts.

Positioning theory-materials can articulate some of the constraints of governing institutions and social systems through the appropriation of narratives and discourses (see also Hammack, 2008; Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Hammack & Tolas, 2015, 2016). Unlike positioning theory in a concern with the concepts of rights and duties, which Warren and Moghadam (2018) highlight and which nicely links this theoretical approach to other fields concerned with justice, such as political philosophy and political science. Their rich application of the theory to Afghanistan and Iraq reveals the way in which the political positioning of the wars there created contested storylines about rights and duties in these contexts.

The final chapter in this section of the volume calls upon social representations theory (e.g., Moscovici, 1988) to examine war and military intervention in the twenty-first century. Cohen and Cohn's (2018) challenge the common assumption that the motivation for war is "in the minds of men," as some social psychological research that focuses on individual attitudes toward war might suggest. Instead, war is a type of social action in which war and military intervention are rooted in social representations constructed by elite and media discourse. Embodiment a critical ontological perspective, they argue that the mindset to engage in war and armed conflict develops a social context in which military intervention is framed as necessary and just. They also offer an analysis of resistance, positioning an alternative set of social representations that can construct "defenses of peace."

Intervention, Advocacy, Social Policy

The final section of the volume explicitly addresses the problem of action in response to social injustice. How might we, as social psychologists, intervene and advocate for social justice? Three of the four chapters in this section are anchored in what has arguably been one of the most prominent social psychological intervention strategies: intergroup contact.

Everywhere on earth we find a condition of separation among groups. People live with their own kind. They eat, play, socialize in homogenous clusters. They visit with their own kind, and prefer to worship together...One sees separation exists; however, the ground is laid for all sorts of psychological elaboration. People who stay separate have fewer channels of communication. They easily exaggerate the degree of difference between groups, and readily misunderstand the grounds for it. And, perhaps most important of all, the separateness may lead to genuine conflicts of interests, as well as to many imaginary conflicts. (Allport, 1954, pp. 17, 19)

Writing and constructing research in an era of formal racial segregation in the United States. Gordon Allport (1954) famously viewed the root cause of prejudice as the lack of contact between groups. While he viewed prejudice as a normal psychological outgrowth of segregation and social categorization, Allport recognized it as the psychological mechanism through which irrational antagonism and hostilities endured. Hence, in his view, a core aim of social psychology is to thwart this process and intergroup contact in separation of groups. Contact between groups, he theorized, might reduce the prejudices that arise in a context of separation and, in turn, foster a culture opposed to segregation. Allport's framework was based on psychological theory and research that had sought to offer an alternative approach that can better address issues of power and raise awareness of privilege among the dominant group (Habay & Stroessner, 2004). A distinct "intercultural" model develops by which people recognize psychological differences between groups and may have sought to offer an alternative approach that can better address issues of power and raise awareness of privilege among the dominant group (Habermas & Pilecki, 2015). In 2005 and 2018, Hammack and Pilecki (2012) highlight these and other approaches to social psychological intervention in conflict settings, revealing pitfalls and possibilities of such interventions.

In 2005, the contact hypothesis was called into question in a critical analysis of its assumptions and aims. Dixon and colleagues (2005) offer what they call a "realistic check" for the original hypothesis, arguing against the overly optimistic evaluation of most social psychologists. They suggest that the optimal contact strategy is unusual in its vision, unrealistic in its assessment of participants' own understandings of social injustice, and rooted in an individualistic notion of conflict and prejudice. They question whether prejudice reduction ought really to be the outcome of research, rather than outcomes more related to social action or social justice (see also Dixon et al., 2012).

Durrheim and Doretti (2018) chapter in this section of the volume extends and updates this analysis, providing a historical analysis of the origins of the contact hypothesis (especially Clark's 1953 articulation). They posit that contact was indeed originally conceived as an important social justice tool in the civil rights era but that the relative emphasis on individual prejudice reduction and intergroup contact has been supplanted by more focused research on the social justice lens that could foreground issues of power (Durrheim & Doretti, 2018). They note that researchers studying actual contact interventions in conflict settings, rather than those studying contact in rarefied laboratory settings or solely through self-report methods, have been able to study issues of power (e.g., Berkman, 2007; Haber & Stroessner, 2004; Hammack & Pilecki, 2015; Mazo, 2006a; Sagy, Dowidio, & Pratto, 2011). They call for a renewed study of the substance of intergroup contact, to understand the way in which such efforts influence processes of meaning-making and power relations between groups.
possibly then (irresolvable) rather than economic terms. Echoing other perspectives in the volume (e.g., Dusenbery & Reajtis, 2018), our approach (2018) analysis reveals the way in which the discourse about social categories themselves has vital implications for social justice and can influence how privileged citizens view subordinate groups. Here we see not only a critical ontological perspective but also an alliance with the subordinate that can undermine the volume injustices of particular social representations.

Globalization is by no means a neutral cultural or economic process, and theoretical perspectives that can accommodate the relative positions of groups and social actors are vital to the social psychological study of global social justice in the twenty-first century. Warren and Moghadam’s (2018) chapter on positioning theory and social justice offers just such a perspective, with its overview of the theory and its application to two national settings of heightened religious and ethnic strife. The theory makes several assumptions rooted in the critical principles outlined in this chapter. Most notably, the theory’s assumptions about the relationship among social structures (or “normative systems”), language, and social reality can be linked to a critical ontological perspective on persons and contexts.

More specifically, spatial representationality entails the consequences of governing institutions and social systems through the appropriation of narratives and discourses (see also Hammack, 2008; Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Hammack & Tafisi, 2015, 2016). Unique to positioning theory is a concern with the concepts of rights and duties, which Warren and Moghadam (2018) highlight and which nicely links this theoretical approach to other fields concerned with justice, such as political philosophy and political science. Their rich application of the theory to Afghanistan and Iraq reveals the way in which the political positioning of the wars there created contested storylines about rights and duties in these contexts.

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One setting in which intergroup contact has been extensively promoted and analyzed is in interracial political conflict, such as Northern Ireland (e.g., Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Ní Meachair, 2006), South Africa (e.g., Dixon & Ketela, 1997), and Israel/Palestine (e.g., Abu-Nimer, 1999; Hammack, Pilecki, & Merrifield, 2014; Mazo, 2000a, 2000b; Ross, 2014). Such efforts have developed to address the specific articulation of the contact hypothesis, particularly since the basic conditions that Allport proposed for optimal effectiveness (e.g., equality between groups) are often unmet. Israeli social psychologist Ilana Maor has devoted much of her career to studying these efforts among Israelis and Palestinians, and her chapter in this section of the volume reviews the distinct models of intergroup contact currently in use. Beyond prejudice reduction, though, Maor (2018) suggests that different models of contact may be more likely to promote social justice between groups in asymmetric conflict. For example, the traditional “contact” model which has been dominant in intergroup encounters between Israelis and Palestinians emphasizes prejudice reduction and cross-group friendship but does not address issues of history and power asymmetry, which critics have argued favors the status quo of the Israeli military occupation (e.g., Belkowitz & Maor, 2005; Hammack, 2009, 2011a; Suleiman, 2004). A distinct "contextualization" model developed in Israel and rooted in social identity theory has sought to offer an alternative approach that can better address issues of power and raise awareness of privilege among the dominant group (Halabi & Suleiman, 2004). While Israeli social psychology has sought to offer an alternative approach that can better address issues of power and raise awareness of privilege among the dominant group (Halabi & Suleiman, 2004), Maor (2018) highlights these and other approaches to social psychological intervention in conflict settings, revealing pitfalls and possibilities of such interventions.

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Durham and Díaz (2018) in this section of the volume extends and updates this analysis, providing a historical analysis of the origins of the contact hypothesis (especially Clark’s 1955 articulation). They posit that contact was indeed originally conceived as an important social justice tool in the civil rights era but that the relative emphasis on individual prejudice reduction and interpersonal processes such as friendship and equality has clouded the social justice lens that could foreground issues of power (Durham & Díaz, 2018). They note that researchers studying actual contact interventions in conflict settings, rather than those studying contact in rarefied laboratory settings or solely through self-report methods, have been able to study issues of power (e.g., Bekerman, 2007; Halabi & Suleiman, 2004; Hammack & Pilecki, 2015; Mazo, 2000a; Suleiman, 2004; Savio, Díaz, & Pratta, 2018). They call for a renewed study of the substance of intergroup contact, to understand the way in which such efforts influence processes of meaning making and power relations between groups.

The approach to intergroup dialogue which Nagla, Guri, and colleagues have developed and promoted for some time has actually developed independently from this line of contact research. Their notion of intergroup dialogue has been explicitly rooted in a social justice educational perspective from the start (e.g., Nagla, Guri, & Zuniga, 2013; Nagla, 2006; Nagla & Guri, 2007). Although these interventions focus on prejudice reduction and relationship formation (i.e., friendship) as desirable outcomes. Nagla, Guri, and Rodriguez (2018) highlight the way in which intergroup dialogue seeks to move beyond the aspiration for social justice. Unlike many contact efforts which have a less formal pedagogy, intergroup dialogue has a specific curriculum intended to educate about differences and social conflicts, and in which intergroup intervention are rooted in social representations constructed by elite and media discourse. Embodying a critical ontological perspective, they argue that the mindset to engage in war and armed conflict develops a social context in which military intervention is framed as necessary and just. They also offer an analysis of resistance, positioning an alternative set of social representations that can construct “defenses of peace.”
potential of intergroup dialogue to work for social justice. Their approach draws upon contact theory, social identity theory, and critical pedagogy (e.g., of Freire, 1970/2000), thus providing an integrative perspective on intervention for social justice.

The final contribution to the volume offers a different model for how social psychologists can work for social justice through direct social policy influence. Greg Herek was at the forefront of social psychological research on heterosexism and homophobia in the 1980s when he situated the corresponding attitudes of these ideologies within the concept of prejudice (e.g., Herek, 1984, 1988, 1990). He was thus a leader in the movement to shift the lens of stigma away from the sexual minority person, toward a heterosexist society that created and legitimized homophobia and direct violence against sexual minorities (e.g., Herek, 1990, 1998, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). Beyond this significant contribution, though, Herek has been a leader among social psychologists who have penetrated the legal system to use psychological evidence to advocate for social justice for sexual minorities. Herek's contribution to the volume provides a narrative of his advocacy for sexual minority rights and legal recognition, focusing especially on the 2010 federal case that overturned California's Proposition 8 and paved the way for marriage equality across the nation (Hammack & Windell, 2011). Herek provides an invaluable blueprint for the would-be scientific activist, to better understand how the legal system can be influenced with the empirical evidence that social psychologists typically collect. The scientific advocacy of social psychologists like Herek—along with others such as Craig Haney who has advocated for prison reform, Michelle Fine who has advocated for educational reform, and many others—is a model for our own disciplinary practice. Such a practice is at the core of a commitment to public science—a knowledge production industry committed not to personal advancement but to social change in the interests of social justice. We who are committed to this model of activist scholarship are part of a long and distinguished line of justice-oriented social psychologists, from Ernest Jones and Kenneth Clark, to the late Elinor Gadamer, to Herb Kershman, Bremer Smith, Rhoda Unger, Michelle Fine, Craig Haney, Greg Herek, and so many others today. Now more than ever, our commitment to take up the call to produce knowledge that can fully be "use" to society.

Social Justice: An Imperative of the Present

This volume appears at a time in history in which the core problems that motivated the birth of social psychology—ethnic nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism, anti-Stalinism, and other threats to democracy—have resumed to prominence. The election of Donald J. Trump in the United States, part of a larger movement across the globe characterized by rising nationalism and social policies of exclusion, reminds us that history does not always take the form of a linear narrative. The contemporary context for social psychological science, then, is the chaotic rhetoric of social hierarchy has resumed, even if at times veiled through the rhetoric of "security." The ethic of cultural pluralism that came to define postwar institutions such as the United Nations now competes with this erosion of nationalism and humanism. So social psychology finds itself in a new context of extraordinary social relevance. The illusion that science, empiricism, or rationality would prevail—certainly the basic assumption of all the social sciences that flourished in the twentieth century—is no more. What, then, are we to do?

The chapters in this volume envision a new, more critical and less naïve vision for social psychology. These chapters are defined first and foremost with a key principle grounded in the empirical legacy of the twentieth century the principle of critical antinomy—the notion that individual subjectivity is at some level a slave to the social structure and its accompanying discourse about social categories. This principle does not suggest that human nature is illusory but it does emphasize the way in which agency is constrained especially by the force of institutions, social policies, and discourse (Hammack & Teo, 2016). The chapters in the volume offer strategies for thinking through the perpetuation of a system of oppression to understand how to counter it. It is not ideological to suggest that fairness and equality characterize the nature of social relations and that societies codify and reproduce knowledge that can fully be "use" to society.

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Acknowledgments

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References


potential of intergroup dialogue to work for social justice. Their approach draws upon contract theory, social identity theory, and critical pedagogy (e.g., of Freire, 1970/2000), thereby providing an integrative perspective on intervention for social justice.

The final contribution to the volume offers a different model for how social psychologists can work for social justice through direct social policy influence. Greg Herok was at the forefront of social psychological research on haremization and homophobia in the 1980s when he situated the corresponding attitudes of these ideologies within the concept of prejudice (e.g., Herok, 1984, 1988, 1990). He was thus a leader in the movement to shift the lens of stigma away from the sexual minority person, toward a heterosexual society that created and legitimized homophobic and direct violence against sexual minorities (e.g., Herok, 1990, 1998, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). Beyond this significant contribution, though, Herok has been a leader among social psychologists who have penetrated the legal system to use psychological evidence to advocate for social justice for sexual minorities. Herok’s contribution to the volume provides a narrative of his advocacy for sex- ual minority rights and legal recognition, focusing especially on the 2010 federal case that overturned California’s Proposition 8 and paved the way for marriage equality across the nation (Hammack & Windell, 2011). Herok provides an invaluable blueprint for the would-be scientific activist, to better understand how the legal system can be influenced with the empirical evidence that social psychologists typically collect.

The scientific advocacy of social psychologists like Herok—along with others such as Craig Haney who has advocated for prison reform, Michelle Fine who has advocated for educational reform, and many others—in forms our own disciplinary practice. Such a practice is at the core of a commitment to public science—a knowledge production industry committed not to personal advancement but to social change in the interest of social justice. We who are committed to this model of activist scholarship are part of a long and distinguished line of justice-oriented social psychologists. Elements of this tradition include Ferdinand de Saussure, Karl Marx, Karl Popper, Michel Foucault, Richard T. Feierabend, and Susan B. Anthony. We are committed to social change by bringing to bear analytic and methodological tools oriented toward social change.

Social Justice: An Imperative of the Present

This volume appears at a time in history in which the core problems that motivated the birth of social psychology—ethnic nationalism, racism, and anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and other threats to democracy—have returned to prominence. The election of Donald J. Trump in the United States, part of a larger movement across the globe characterized by rising nationalism and social policies of exclusion, reminds us that history does not always take the form of a linear narrative. The contemporary context for social psychological science, then, is one in which the rhetoric of social hierarchy has resurfaced, even if at times veiled through the rhetoric of "security." The ethic of cultural pluralism that came to define postwar institutions such as the United Nations now comprises with this current of irrational nationalism and anti-immigrationism. And so social psychology finds itself in a new context of extraordinary social relevance. The illusion that race, ethnicity, and rationality would prevail—certainly the basic assumption of all the social sciences that flourished in the twentieth century—is no more. What, then, are we to do?

The chapters in this volume envision a new, more critical and less naïve vision for social psychology. These chapters are defined first and foremost with a key principle grounded in the empirical legacy of the twentieth century: the principle of critical antinomies—the notion that individual subjectivity is at some level a slave to the social structure and its accompanying discourse about social categories. This principle does not suggest that human nature is illusory but that it emphasizes the way in which agency is constrained especially by the force of institutions, social policies, and discourses (Hammack & Troxel, 2016). The chapters in the volume call us to reflect upon and to guard against the violence, terror, and trauma undergirding the violence they take. It is not ideological to suggest that fairness and equality characterize the nature of social relations and that societies codify it, but it is political to socialize it in law and society.

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